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2NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
There are two basic ways in which an intermediate good may
be exchanged in a market: (1) a producer may first produce
the good and then sell it (advance production or a spot
market); or (2) a producer may sign a contract with a buyer first
and then produce the good (production to order or a forward
market). In market economies commodities are typically traded
both in spot and forward markets. Agents can choose whether
to transact in the spot market or the forward market or both. In
most cases there also exists a possibility to vertically integrate,
i.e. to combine a buyer and a seller into one firm.
Most transactions between firms in the former Russian
command system occurred in the way similar to intrafirm
transactions. Spot and forward commodity markets have been
formed only recently or are being formed now. Firms which
transact in the spot market, which is just being formed, may be
exposed to high risk. This market may be thin or nonexistent in
some periods, creating additional costs for the firms which use
it. Prices reported from such a market may not be good
indicators of true supply-demand situations. As a result, firms
making production decisions based on the reported market
prices may not use resources in the most efficient manner.
Risks experienced in an infant spot market could be reduced
via the use of simple forward contracts, which set the price,
quantity, and quality of products to be traded in a future
transaction. However, high uncertainty and undeveloped legal
and market institutions in the transition economy raise a
probability of a partner not fulfilling contractual obligations.
Often the contract fails or its fulfillment requires additional
transaction costs. The probability of a forward contract failure
may have a significant economic effect. If methods of
exchange such as open production or spot markets and simple
contracts cannot ensure efficient price and quantity discovery
and are costly, firms may have a strong motivation to vertically
integrate or use integration-like contractual arrangements.
Such consolidation may solve problems in the short term, but in
the long term it is unhealthy. Fewer market transactions with
intermediate goods lead to inefficiencies, such as under-
3utilization of processing facilities.  The old Soviet command
system, where whole industries were treated as a single firm,
was the ultimate example of vertical integration, and of the
inefficiency which it causes.
The objective of this research is to study price and quantity
discovery when there is (1) an endogenous choice between
alternative market institutions (forward and spot) and vertical
integration; and (2) some probability of contract failure in the
forward market. This research used models and laboratory
experiments to measure how increased risk of forward contract
failure reduces trading, pushes agents onto the spot market,
and pushes them into vertical integration.  The use of
laboratory techniques rather than real data was inevitable due
to the lack of reliable price and quantity field data on Russian
commodity markets.  Indeed, this lack is a symptom of the
inefficiency of those markets.
Economic models of a competitive risk averse firm were tested
in the laboratory setting. The results of the economic models
suggest that when there is only a forward market, even a low
(5%) probability of contract failure affects the market
significantly resulting in a decreased quantity and increased
price. Linking the forward market of a good with the relevant
spot market reduces the effect of contract failure, if the goods
that should have been traded forward after the breach can be
retraded on the spot market. However, a high (50%) probability
of contract failure decreases quantity traded in the forward
market. In the latter case, risk aversion forces both forward and
spot prices to increase, with the spot price being higher than
the forward price. The models showed a significant worsening
when forward failure and spot retrading do involve extra cost.
In such a case, although agents still prefer to transact most
business on the forward market, there is a major shrinkage in
the forward market and growth in the spot market.
These theoretical results were confirmed by the results of 18
laboratory sessions. And applied to Russia, where spot markets
are often thin or overpriced, the weakness of forward markets
leads straight to vertical integration.  Analysis of price, quantity
and earnings data generated in the experimental sessions
suggest that agents have strong motivation to vertically
integrate when forward risk exceeds 5% and there is no linked
4spot market, or when forward risk exceeds 50% and spot
retrading involves extra cost.
This project is one of a few empirical research studies in the
transaction cost economics. The project’s results emphasize
the importance of reliable legal institutions. If legal institutions
are not in place to enforce contracts between buyers and
sellers in forward trading, a viable spot market is essential. The
spot market acts like an insurance mechanism for forward
trades and the forward markets remain dominant, even though
there may be a possibility of high contract failure.
The results of the study explain reasons for consolidation
tendencies observed in Russian food market. Contractual
obligations often are not fulfilled (entirely or in part) as a result
of some exogenous forces rather than the parties' opportunism.
But risk of inventory loss in the evolving spot market, or its thin
nature, prevents firms from relying on the spot market instead
of the unreliable forward market.  As a result, producers have
started to expand processing facilities resulting in a significant
decrease in agricultural products delivered to specialized
processing firms. This creates inefficiencies resulting from
plants not being utilized to capacity, and has induced
processing firms to often initiate integration-like contractual
arrangements.  The state food policy supports the vertical
integration, without giving attention to the fact that more vertical
integration results in less market transactions of an
intermediate good.  State food policy must be refocused from
facilitating consolidation in the food market toward
strengthening the legal system and developing the market
infrastructure, in order to facilitate making the forward and spot
markets in the Russian food sector less risky.  This may
contribute to the creation of a system which makes resources
to move to their most efficient use.
51. INTRODUCTION
Two successive stages in a vertical chain of production and
marketing for a good may be connected either through vertical
integration (intrafirm exchange), or through a market (interfirm)
exchange. There are two basic ways in which an intermediate
good may be exchanged in a market: (1) a producer may first
produce the good and then sell it, or (2) a producer may sign a
contract with a buyer first and then produce the good. The
former is called production to stock (advance production) or a
spot market; the latter is called production to order or a forward
market (Carlton, 1989, p. 941).
The advantages of production to order are straightforward
when the product is heterogeneous and a seller needs to know
the exact characteristics a buyer desires in the good. But even
when a good is homogeneous, both sellers and buyers may
want to contract forward to avoid price and quantity risks. The
simplest form of a forward contract which sets the price,
quantity and quality of a product to be traded in a future
transaction is called a market specification contract (Barkema,
Drabenstott and Welch, 1991).
In market economies, often both a spot market and a forward
market exist for a commodity. In this case agents can choose
to transact in the spot market, in the forward market or both. In
most cases there also exists a possibility to integrate vertically if
the costs of transacting in these markets are too high.
Most transactions among firms in the former Russian command
system were similar to intrafirm transactions. Spot and forward
commodity markets have therefore been formed very recently
or are being formed now. This is why it is particularly interesting
and important to study how a firm chooses a marketing channel
for its product.
Agricultural and food markets are among those for which such
a study may be especially important. In countries with a market
economy, for instance the USA, cattle, food and feed grains are
traditionally sold mainly spot through so-called “organized
markets”. Such markets are thought to provide an efficient
method of price discovery, and the price information is widely
6used to make production and marketing decisions (Tomek and
Robinson, 1972; Ward, 1981).
Spot agricultural markets in Russia must evolve in the presence
of the dominance of administrative coordination. As a result,
firms which transact in the spot market may be exposed to high
risk. This market may be thin or nonexistent in some periods,
creating additional costs for the firms which use it. One relevant
concern is that the prices reported from spot markets which are
just being formed may not be good indicators of true supply-
demand situations. As a result, firms making production
decisions based on the reported market prices may not use
resources in the most economic manner (Center for Rural
Affairs, 1990).
The risks experienced in the infant open market could be
reduced via the use of simple forms of contracts. There is,
however, another problem which is very common in the
transition economy of Russia. Contract obligations may not be
met or fulfilled by the parties, even when a state organization is
one of the parties. There is some probability that contractual
obligations may not be honored in any economic system. This
problem, however, is much more prevalent in the case of a
transition economy. In transition economies, legal, state and
economic institutions are changing, and this (at least
temporarily) reduces the efficiency of the legal system. In this
case, it is much easier to break contractual obligations without
suffering the consequences. Remedies for contract breach, in
fact, could be included in the contract itself (Shavell, 1984).
When the economic situation is unstable, as in a transition
economy, the probability that a firm might prefer to break a
contract and pay the damages is much greater than it is in a
stable economic system. Finally, in the transition economy of
Russia, delays in payments for goods and services delivered
according to a forward contract quite often lead to a reduction
in the benefits from the trade. Thus, weak legal and economic
institutions may often generate additional costs for those who
transact in such a market. The possibility of a contract failure
may have significant economic impacts. If methods of
exchange such as open production or spot markets and simple
contracts cannot provide efficient price and quantity discovery
7and are costly, firms may have a strong motivation to integrate
vertically or rely on integration-like contractual arrangements.
A complete and separate study would be required to estimate
the severity of the contract failures in Russia. We can, however,
provide data which highlight the importance of the issue of
contract failure. About 85% of the milk producers, 75% of the
producers of vegetables, livestock and grain and 65% of the
sunflower producers have indicated that in 1995 state
procurement organizations did not fulfill their contractual
obligations with them (“Î ðûíêå ñåëüñêîõîçÿéñòâåííîé
ïðîäóêöèè...”, 1996, p. 47). Delayed payments represented
about half the value of goods and production services in 1996
(“Ðûíî÷íûå îòíîøåíèÿ...”, 1997, p.57). In a private
conversation in 1997 middlemen acting in the wholesale food
market indicated that about 50% of the formal agreements
about future transactions were not fulfilled. Such a situation
necessarily influences a firm’s choice of marketing
(procurement) channels. Trades in agricultural products at
commodity exchanges experienced growth during 1992-1993,
but declined significantly beginning in 1994 (Àëèáåêîâ,
Ëóêèíîâ, 1996). Only 6% of grain, 3% of livestock, 4% of sugar
beets, and 17% of sunflower seeds were sold through
wholesale markets, commodity exchanges and fairs in 1995.
Agricultural producers are expanding their processing facilities.
In 1995 producers sold 7% of grain, 54% of sugar beets and
33% of livestock after processing it. Almost one-quarter of
producers had processing facilities, but two-thirds of them used
only half of the capacity of these facilities because of the
shortage of their own raw agricultural products (“Î ðûíêå
ñåëüñêîõîçÿéñòâåííîé ïðîäóêöèè...”, 1996, p. 40). Today
agricultural and processing firms achieve real cost reduction
through long-term comprehensive contractual arrangements
which are very integration-like (Õëûñòóí, 1997). These
tendencies toward integration and consolidation may be the
result of inefficient price discovery and market coordination
systems in Russia. This study is focused on determining the
extent to which contract failure contributes to inefficiency.
The objective of this research is to examine price and quantity
discovery when there is (1) an endogenous choice between
alternative market institutions (forward and spot) and vertical
8integration, and (2) some probability that a trading partner will
not fulfill forward contract obligations (a contract failure). A
laboratory experimental economics technique is used, because
price and quantity data from open markets (for example,
commodity exchanges, wholesale markets and auctions) are
unreliable or lacking, and contract price and quantity data are
mostly reserved information.
2. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
A comparative analysis of alternative forms of vertical
coordination is a primary focus of the transaction cost literature,
which suggests that the transition from an open market system
toward administrative coordination is set in motion because of
the increased costs associated with a price oriented system
(Williamson, 1989). Firms which use a spot market to sell their
products (or to buy inputs) are exposed to price, quantity and
quality risks and, therefore, to additional costs (Barkema,
Drabenstott and Welch, 1991).
Several models have explored ways in which a competitive
firm’s decisions under uncertainty would deviate from those of
a firm operating under certainty, and they have also examined
the effects of an increase in risk aversion on a firm’s decisions
(Sandmo, 1971; Leland, 1972). These models show that a
firm’s response to uncertainty is to adjust its output or input
levels. Holthausen (1979) proposes a model in which a risk-
averse, competitive firm facing price uncertainty can choose to
buy a product in a forward market at a fixed price. The major
finding of the study is that the firm will produce a level of output
that depends only on the forward price and that is, in particular,
independent of the firm’s degree of risk aversion and the
probability distribution of the uncertain price. Finally, the
existence of a forward market will generally induce the firm to
produce a greater output than would have been the case in the
absence of such a market.
Carlton (1979) has developed an equilibrium model of a market
characterized by uncertainty and transaction costs. The model
seeks to explain a firm’s choice between long-term (forward
contract) and short-term (spot) instruments. He shows that in
the short and the long run (assuming a downward sloping
9demand) the magnitude and direction of price movements in
the forward and spot markets can differ. In particular, cost
shocks will induce price movements in the forward and spot
market in the same direction, but by different magnitudes, and
the demand shocks cause the two prices to move in different
directions. Incidentally, this result raises concern regarding
econometric attempts to measure the impact of forward
contracting on market prices when the independent variable is
some measure of spot prices alone. According to this result it is
critical to examine both forward and spot prices in order to
evaluate the impact of forward contracting on a particular
market. A further implication of this model is that spot prices
are more variable in the presence of forward contracts.
Polinsky (1987) addresses the effects of a fixed price contract
and a spot price contract on the allocation of risk between
parties when at least one of them is risk averse. The results of
his theoretical analysis suggest that (p. 43),
“a spot price contract tends to insure a seller against
production-cost uncertainty and a buyer against valuation
uncertainty (although it may overinsure them). A fixed price
contract insures a seller against demand-side uncertainties
and a buyer against supply-side uncertainties. Thus, which
contract form will be preferred by the parties depends on
their relative aversion to risk and the magnitudes of the
supply-side and demand-side uncertainties.”
Hubbard and Weiner (1989) construct a similar model. The
implications of their model, like those of Polinsky, suggest that
changes in contracting behavior can arise from several sources:
the attitudes of the contracting parties toward risk can change
or the relative importance of supply and demand shocks can
shift or both.
Other research has attempted to measure the impact of
forward contracting on price levels and variability using market
generated data (Hayenga and O’Brien, 1991; Elam, 1992;
Schroeder et al., 1993). The results of these studies show that
forward contract deliveries may have a negative impact on the
average cash price, although this effect is often found not to be
statistically significant. The results of these econometric studies
are mostly inconclusive and limited by their dependency on
10
historical data and on the actual levels of forward contracting
observed.
The first series of laboratory trading sessions utilizing an oral
double auction trading mechanism was designed to investigate
the validity of several of the hypotheses of neoclassical
competitive market theory (Smith, 1962). Later, numerous
studies in experimental economics involved the observation of
the effects of various trading institutions on market behavior
and outcomes. Advance production (spot) markets have
received limited attention from experimentalists. In an
experiment in which sellers had to commit to producing units
before trading in a double auction, Smith (1962) observed that
prices tended to converge more slowly (and from below)
toward competitive equilibrium. More recent studies have
focused on aspects of advance production in double auction or
posted-offer markets or both (Mestelman and Welland, 1991a;
Mestelman and Welland, 1991b; Mestelman and Welland, 1988;
Mestelman, Welland and Welland, 1987).
Differences in efficiencies, quantity produced/traded, and
prices in a double auction with advance production and
production-to-demand are explored in Mestelman and Welland
(1987). Their results suggest that the production condition does
not have a statistically significant effect on mean trade prices.
However, levels of production and sales and market efficiency
were found to be slightly lower in the advance production
market relative to production-to-demand.
Experimental studies of price and quantity discovery in a
forward market versus spot market were continued by
Krogmeier et al. (1996). As in Mestelman and Welland (1987)
each of these two markets were separate treatments. However,
increased equilibrium quantity per agent in their model relative
to that in Mestelman and Welland (1987) permitted the authors
to observe that prices converged to a higher behavioral
equilibrium under the spot market treatment relative to the
forward market treatment.
Phillips, Menkhaus and Krogmeier (1997) studied markets in a
laboratory setting in which agents were given a choice of
participating in forward and spot trades. The inventory costs or
risk of loss incurred due to advance production diminishes spot
activity and makes forward trading dominant. In this linked
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market design, spot sales were about 15% of the total. When
there was only a spot market, seller surplus was found to be
relatively high; in a forward only market, buyer surplus was
relatively high. When traders were given a choice of institution,
prices and quantities resembled a forward only auction, but
buyer (seller) surplus was decreased (increased).
We are not aware of any studies of the impacts of a contract
failure on price and quantity discovery in a forward market,
whether in isolation or linked with a spot market. The
economics literature discusses the issue of incomplete
contracting and opportunism. This literature focuses on
transactions which need investments in specific assets and thus
which cause a fundamental transformation of an ex ante
competitive situation into an ex post bilateral monopoly.
Contracts aim at fulfilling two conflicting tasks: (1) reduce risks
(including the risk of opportunism), and (2) offer the parties
enough flexibility to adjust for unplanned future events (Al-
Najjar, 1995). This motivates the parties to use non-price
coordination widely (Williamson, 1989).
We do not intend to discuss issues of specific investments. In
our study a contract failure is caused not by the opportunism of
the parties, but by exogenous factors (for instance, non-
payment problems when a processing firm which has not
received payment for previously processed products cannot
fulfill its obligation of buying a new portion of the agricultural
good to be processed). The good is homogeneous, and the
market is competitive both ex ante and ex post. We have tried
to focus on a situation involving only simple contracts (of a
classic type as in Williamson, 1989) in an economy which is
very unstable and in which legal and market institutions are only
just being formed so that there is some probability that a
contract may either (1) fail completely and the respective
parties need to make a new trade in the spot market, or (2) the
performance of the contract requires some additional cost. The
probability of contract failure is determined explicitly.
3. MODEL SPECIFICATION
Although many goods are sold in the spot and forward markets
and forward contract failure is a general problem as well, we
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believe that the model and the experimental design outlined
below are more applicable to the food market than to financial
markets or even other commodity markets. First of all, we
examine a competitive market, which is not the sort of market
characteristic of industries with a two-price (forward and spot)
system such as the coal or natural gas industries. Likewise,
there is no inventory carryover in our model and experiments,
and this is consistent with the market for perishables such as
many agricultural products, but less applicable to other
commodities. Finally, our model and experiments are more
applicable to markets for commodities than they are to financial
markets because sunk production costs are the key element
which distinguishes the spot market (advance production) from
the forward market (production to order).
We have used the expected value-variance (EV) approach to
incorporate risk into the economic models. This approach was
originally developed by Markowitz (1952) to explain
diversification of financial assets by investors. It was later
extended by Tobin (1958) to include risk-free assets, and then
it was applied in an equilibrium analysis by Sharpe (1964),
Fama (1976) and Lintner (1965) to the risk pricing of assets.
Robison and Barry (1987, pp. 5-6 and 71-75) compare the EV
and expected utility (EU) approaches and conclude that the use
of the EV model is due to its strengths as an analytical tool
rather than as a decision tool. The primary analytical strengths
of the EV model are the relative ease with which it can be used
to derive optimal solutions and conduct equilibrium analyses,
the natural relationship between the concepts of risk and
variability and the statistical concept of variance, and fact that
the micro results can be extended readily to an aggregate
analysis. The concepts of risk aversion, risk premium and the
certainty equivalent are central to the economic theory of
decisions under risk (Robison and Barry, 1987). The absolute
risk aversion function may be incorporated into the certainty
equivalent relationship through the use of Pratt’s local
approximation formula. Pratt’s approximation relationship
indicates that:
2
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The models which follow reflect the case of a producer or seller
in a competitive market. Market effects are also investigated
through the development of the buyer case (Appendix B).
Numerical examples are provided to demonstrate more clearly
the effects of contract failure and the transaction costs in the
linked forward/spot market (Appendix B).
3.1. Forward Only Market with Possible
Contract Failure (FCF)
Consider a firm which is operating in a competitive forward
market where each unit is sold through a separate contract and
each contract might fail separately with some known
probability. Moreover, the firm has an option to continue
transacting in the market or to integrate vertically and receive
an income G that is certain.1
Let ρ be the probability of failure for each unit traded in the
forward market. Let ε=Σει, i = 1,...,qf, be a binomially distributed
random variable whereby a probability of success is (1-ρ) and
qf is the quantity traded and produced. Then, E(ε) = qf(1-ρ) and
σ2(ε) = qf(ρ−ρ2).
The risky profit for the seller is Π = pf×ε - C(qf), where pf is a sale
price in the forward market and C(qf) is a production cost. The
expected profit and variance of profit are:
E(Π) = pf×qf(1−ρ) - C(qf)       and         σ2(Π) = pf2qf(ρ-ρ2),
respectively.
The certainty equivalent of the profit expression following
Robison and Barry (1987) is:
ΠCE = pf×qf(1-ρ) - C(qf) - 
2
λ ×pf2qf(ρ-ρ2) (3.1.1)
If max{ΠCE(qf)} < G, a firm has an incentive to integrate
vertically. If ΠCE(qf) > G for some qf, the first order condition
requires:
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f
CE
dq
dΠ  = pf(1-ρ) - C′(qf) - 
2
λ ×pf2(ρ-ρ2) = 0        and
pf(1-ρ) = C′(qf) + 
2
λ
⋅pf2(ρ−ρ2) (3.1.2)
The predicted effects of the risk associated with contract failure
in a forward only market (FCF) from the economic model
suggest that a risk averse producer would reduce output,
resulting in a higher price, as compared to the no contract
failure case (F). If the forward market with contract failure
generates a profit for which the certainty equivalent is lower
than the certain income in a vertical integration case, a
producer is motivated to integrate vertically.
3.2. Linked Forward/Spot Market (L)
Consider a firm which can choose how it markets its products,
whether to sell in the forward market or to trade in the spot
market. Again, a firm can also vertically integrate and receive a
certain income, G. Let qf and qs be the quantities of the units
produced to be traded in the forward and spot markets,
respectively, and qf+qs = q. Also, let pf and ps be forward and
spot prices, respectively. Let v be a normally distributed
random variable with E(v) = 0 and σ2(v). Then, the random spot
price can be expressed as (ps+v).2
The risky profit is:
Π = pf⋅qf + (ps+v)⋅qs - C(q)
The expected profit and the variance of the profit are:
E(Π) = pf⋅qf + ps⋅qs - C(q)    and    σ2(Π) = qs2⋅σ2(v),
respectively.
The certainty equivalent of the profit expression is:
ΠCE = pf⋅qf + ps⋅qs - C(q) - λ
2
⋅qs2⋅σ2(v) (3.2.1)
If max{ΠCE(q)} < G, a firm has an incentive to integrate
vertically. If ΠCE(q) > G for some q, the first order conditions
require:
d
dq
CE
f
Π  = pf - Cf′(qf) = 0
15
d
dq
CE
s
Π
 = ps - Cs′(qs) - λqs⋅σ2(v) = 0
Then,
pf = Cf′(qf) (3.2.2)
ps = Cs′(qs) + λqs⋅σ2(v) (3.2.3)
In the case of a reliable linked forward/spot market (L), for a
producer (seller) to be indifferent as regards the forward and
spot markets the spot price must be higher than the forward
price. This is because of the added cost associated with the
risk of inventory loss in the spot market. To understand more
accurately what to expect in the case of a linked market, we
have provided numerical calculations using the production cost
and redemption value schedules for the experiment. According
to the numerical calculations (see Appendix B), the risk of loss
in the spot market would force a seller to trade all units in the
forward market, and the forward price would be the same as in
the case of a “reliable” forward only market (F).
3.3. Linked Forward/Spot Market with Possible
Contract Failure (LCF)
Consider a firm which can choose how to market its products,
whether to sell in the forward market with possible contract
failure or trade in the spot market. Again, a firm can also
vertically integrate and receive a certain income, G. Let qf and
qs, pf and ps be as previously defined. As in the case of the
forward only market with possible contract failure, let ε = Σεi, i =
1,...,qf, be a binomially distributed random variable with the
probability of success at (1-ρ). Then, γ = Σ(1-εi) is a random
variable which equals the number of failures.
As in the previous case, the random spot price can be
expressed as (ps+v), where v is a normally distributed random
variable, with E(v) = 0 and σ2(v). We assume that Σεi and v (and
also Σ(1-εi) and v) are independent. This assumption seems
reasonable since an individual competitive seller would hardly
see any dependency between the quantity of failed forward
trades and a spot price.
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The risky profit is:
Π = pf⋅ε+ (ps+v)⋅[γ+qs] - C(q)
The expected profit and the variance of profit are (for
calculations of the variance of profit, see Appendix A):
E(Π) = pfqf(1-ρ) + ps(qfρ+qs) - C(q)         and
σ2(Π) = qf(ρ-ρ2)⋅[(pf-ps)2 + σ2(v)] + σ2(v)⋅(qs+ρqf)2
The certainty equivalent of the profit expression is:
ΠCE = pfqf(1-ρ) + ps(qfρ+qs) - C(q) -
- 
2
λ
⋅{qf(ρ-ρ2)⋅[(pf-ps)2+σ2(v)] + σ2(v)⋅(qs+ρqf)2} (3.3.1)
If max{ΠCE(q)} < G, a firm has an incentive to integrate
vertically. If ΠCE(q) > G for some value of q, the first order
conditions require:
f
CE
dq
dΠ
 = pf(1-ρ) + psρ - C′f(qf) - 
2
λ
⋅{(ρ-ρ2)⋅[(pf-ps)2+σ2(v)] +
+σ2(v)⋅(2ρqs+2ρ2qf)} = 0
s
CE
dq
dΠ  = ps - C′s(qs) - λ⋅σ2(v)⋅(qs+ρqf) = 0
Then,
pf(1-ρ) + psρ = C′f(qf) + λ⋅{(1/2)⋅(ρ−ρ2)⋅[(pf-ps)2+σ2(v)] +
+ σ2(v)⋅ρ⋅(qs+ρqf)} (3.3.2)
ps = C′s(qs) + λ⋅σ2(v)⋅(qs+ρqf) (3.3.3)
In the case of a linked forward/spot market with possible
forward contract failure (LCF), the risk of contract failure
increases the costs of transacting in the forward and the spot
linked markets. The results of the numerical calculations from
the theoretical models (Appendix B) suggest that, when the
probability of forward contract failure is small (5%), risk
aversion forces the agents to transact more heavily in the
forward linked market. The forward quantity tends to be higher,
while the forward price tends to be lower, as compared to the
situation in the reliable forward only (F) and reliable linked (L)
markets. According to the calculations there should be no spot
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production, although the spot price should be higher than the
forward price. (Note that, even though there is no spot
production, there still could be spot trades of units which failed
in the forward market. Thus, there could be a spot price.) An
increased probability of forward contract failure (50%) reduces
the forward quantity, but by only a small amount, and prompts
some spot production. In this case, the forward quantity is
slightly lower than it is in the reliable forward only (F) or the
linked (L) markets. Risk aversion forces the forward and the
spot prices to be higher than they are in the case of a 5%
probability of forward contract failure (and also higher than they
are in the F and L markets), with the spot price still higher than
the forward price. These results, however, are affected by the
relative risk aversion of sellers and buyers.
3.4. Linked Forward/Spot Market with Possible
Transaction Costs (LTC)
Again, a firm can choose whether to transact in the forward or
the spot market, or vertically integrate and receive a certain
income, G. We consider in this case that there is a possibility of
an additional transaction cost for a trade in the forward linked
market. As in earlier cases, let qf and qs be the quantities of
units produced to be traded in the forward and spot markets,
respectively, and qf+qs = q. Also let pf and ps be forward and
spot prices, respectively. For the spot price we make the same
assumptions as in the previous case.
This time “a failed trade” means that the respective buyer and
seller each incurs an additional cost of transacting (t). Again, let
ε = Σεi, i = 1,...,qf, be a binomially distributed random variable
with the probability of success (that is, εi = 1) at ρ. Here, the
success in Bernoulli’s exercise causes failure for a trade.
The risky profit is:
Π = pf⋅qf + (ps+v)⋅qs - C(q) - t⋅ε
The expected profit and the variance of the profit are:
E(Π) = pf⋅qf + ps⋅qs - C(q) - t⋅ρ⋅qf     and
σ2(Π) = qs2⋅σ2(v) + t2⋅qf⋅(ρ−ρ2),
respectively.
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The certainty equivalent of the profit expression is:
ΠCE = pf⋅qf + ps⋅qs - C(q) - t⋅ρ⋅qf -
- 
2
λ
⋅[qs2⋅σ2(v) + t2⋅qf⋅(ρ−ρ2)] (3.4.1)
If max{ΠCE(q)} < G, a firm has an incentive to integrate
vertically. If ΠCE(q) > G for some value of q, first order
conditions require:
d
dq
CE
f
Π
 = pf - Cf′(qf) - t⋅ρ - λ
2
⋅t2⋅(ρ-ρ2) = 0
d
dq
CE
s
Π
 = ps - Cs′(qs) - λqs⋅σ2(v) = 0
Then,
pf = Cf′(qf) + t⋅ρ + 2
λ
⋅t2⋅(ρ-ρ2)     and (3.4.2)
ps = Cs′(qs) + λqs⋅σ2(v) (3.4.3)
In the case of a linked market with possible transaction costs
for a forward trade (LTC), a producer’s choice between the
forward and spot markets depends on the value of the sum of
the expected transaction cost and the transaction cost risk in
the forward market, as compared to the risk of loss in the spot
market. The numerical results suggest that, when there is a
50% probability of an additional transaction cost of 10 tokens
for a forward trade for both sellers and buyers, subjects still
prefer to transact most units in the forward market, although
the quantity traded forward is lower than it is in the case of the
linked (L) and linked with contract failure (LCF) markets. Risk
aversion forces a reduction in the quantity traded in the forward
LTC market, an increase in the quantity traded spot, and higher
prices in the forward and the spot linked markets, with the spot
price higher than the forward price. For the same value of the
risk aversion coefficient (0.01), the forward and spot prices in
the LTC(50;10) market are slightly higher as compared to the
linked market, with a 50% probability of forward contract
failure, LCF(50). As in the case of a linked market with forward
contract failure, these results are affected by the relative risk
aversion of sellers and buyers. For each of the linked markets
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above, if none of the forward or spot linked markets generates
a profit for which the certainty equivalent is higher than the
certain income in a vertical integration case, a producer has an
incentive to integrate vertically.
Overall, the results of the economic models and numerical
examples developed in this study suggest that, when there is a
forward only market, even a low probability of contract failure
affects the market significantly, resulting in a lower quantity and
a higher price. Linking the forward market with a spot market
reduces the effect of contract failure, although a high
probability of contract failure decreases the quantity traded in
the forward linked market. In the latter case, risk aversion
forces the forward and spot prices to increase, with the spot
price higher than the forward price. If an additional transaction
cost is associated with forward contract failure rather than an
opportunity to retrade failed units in the spot market, the linked
market is affected greatly. Although subjects still prefer to
transact greater quantities in the forward linked market, the
quantity traded forward decreases, and the quantity traded
spot increases. Forward and spot prices increase relative to the
no contract failure case, with the spot price higher than the
forward price. These results, however, are affected by the
relative risk aversion of sellers and buyers.
4. METHODOLOGY
4.1. Experiment Design and Risk Preference
Assessment
Laboratory experimental economics (as described by Plott,
1982; Smith, 1982) is used to obtain data for the analysis.
Fundamentally, experimental economics is the study of
individual choice in the context of an economic institution
(Smith, 1982). The objective is to set up a laboratory
experiment which will create a manageable model of a real
world phenomenon, whereby adequate control can be
maintained and the accurate measurement of relevant variables
can be guaranteed (Wilde, 1980).
During the fall of 1997 and winter of 1998, 18 experimental
sessions were conducted: three replications for each of six
treatments (forward market, forward with a 5% possibility of
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contract failure, linked forward/spot market, linked market with
a 5% and then a 50% possibility of contract failure, and finally,
linked market with a 50% possibility of additional transaction
costs for a contract).3 As in Mestelman and Welland (1987) and
Krogmeier et al. (1996), four buyers and four sellers
participated in each session. Market participants were mostly
recruited from among those SPSUEF students of the third,
fourth and fifth course year who expressed a willingness to
participate in the laboratory experiment.4 The advantages of
using students as experiment participants are (Freidman and
Sunder, 1994, p. 39) (1) the convenience of recruitment, (2)
the low opportunity cost of student subjects, (3) the relatively
steep learning curve, and (4) some lack of exposure to
confounding external information. None of the participants
possessed experience as agents in a laboratory study.
The experiments utilized an oral double auction. (We had to
reject the use of computers because of technical problems.
Moreover, oral auctions show a more rapid convergence toward
a competitive equilibrium than do computerized auctions.) A
double auction is a market institution in which buyers compete
by increasing price bids, while sellers compete by reducing
price offers. The transaction prices are found somewhere
between the initial bids and the offers. Each session consisted
of eight cycles, where a cycle was a time-span in which trades
were conducted and terminated when the trading by
participants was completed.
The buyers were given a table which listed the maximum
reservation values for each unit purchased; these values were
described to buyers as redemption values. Similarly, the sellers
were informed of unit costs. The redemption values were
identical for each buyer, and the production costs were
identical for each of the four sellers. The redemption values and
production costs which were used in each experiment session
are listed in Table 1. Redemption values, costs and the
earnings of the participants were denoted in an artificial
currency called “tokens”, which were convertible into rubles at
a rate of 50 tokens for each ruble (or 1,000 rubles in 1997).
Each buyer in each session was allowed to purchase, one at a
time, up to eight units in each trading period. The units had to
be purchased in a specified order: the first unit purchased in
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each period had to be the highest valued unit; the second unit
purchased had to be the second highest valued unit, and so on.
Likewise, each seller in a trading cycle was allowed to sell, one
at a time, up to eight units. The units had to be produced and
sold in a specified order: the first unit produced (sold) had to
be the lowest cost unit; the second unit produced (sold) had to
be the second lowest cost unit, and so on.
Table 1. Redemption Values and Unit Costs Used in the Experiment
UNIT REDEMPTION VALUE UNIT COST
1 130 30
2 120 40
3 110 50
4 100 60
5 90 70
6 80 80
7 70 90
8 60 100
According to induced value theory (Smith, 1982), the values
and costs constitute individual supply and demand per trading
period. When summed horizontally (over four buyers and four
sellers), these represent the market supply and demand curves
shown in Figure 1. The individual demand schedule is given by
p = 135-10q, and the supply schedule has the form p =
25+10q. Competitive price theory predicts an equilibrium price
of 80 tokens and market sales of between 20 and 24 units per
period.
For a buyer, the earnings on each unit purchased equal the
redemption value of the particular unit, less the price paid to
the seller. For a seller, the earnings on each unit sold equal the
price received by the seller, less the production cost of the
particular unit. Earnings are accumulated over the sequence of
trading cycles. Record sheets were prepared for use by the
participants, so that they could keep track of their trades and
earnings. Participants were paid at the end of the session, with
earnings dependent on performance in the experiment.
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Figure 1. Market Supply and Demand
tokens
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As in the study reported by Phillips, Menkhaus and Krogmeier
(1997), buyers were allowed to purchase at prices above the
reservation value, and sellers were allowed to sell at prices
below cost. Two reasons are given for this departure from the
usual rule in previous studies (Phillips, Menkhaus and
Krogmeier, 1997). First, it is felt that, by not forcing subjects to
generate positive earnings, one allows for the validation of the
clarity of the instructions and the sufficiency of financial
motivation. One would not expect buyers (sellers) repeatedly to
buy (sell) at prices above (below) the value (cost), if they fully
understand the instructions, and the financial motivation is
salient and dominant. Second, in the linked design, it is
necessary to allow sellers in the spot session to sell below cost
in order to mitigate the possible losses due to forward contract
failure and over-production for the spot market. To maintain
symmetry between buyers and sellers and across treatments,
the usual rule was relaxed for all participants.
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Each participant was given an initial token balance of 700
tokens (14 rubles) at the beginning of each session. Although a
nonsalient reward, this initial balance seemed necessary in both
markets, since, in the spot market of the linked design, sellers
must incur production costs before they can be given the
opportunity to earn profit from sales, and in the forward market
a trade may fail. An additional concern is that the initial
endowment be large enough to preclude the possibility of
individual bankruptcy. This could be a particular concern for
sellers in the spot market and in the “unreliable” forward
market, where a failure to sell could result in large losses.
Buyers (sellers) were told that they were allowed to buy (sell)
units only until the total procurement (production) cost
exceeded the token balance they had possessed at the
beginning of a period. The level of the initial balance was
chosen so that in the first period a buyer would be able to buy
up to eight units. In order to maintain symmetry between
buyers and sellers and across treatments, the initial balance
was given to all participants.
During a double auction trading period, buyers were allowed to
submit bids at any time for a single unit of a fictitious
commodity. Valid bids had to follow an “improvement” rule, that
is, for the bid to be displayed to the market, it had to be higher
than the previously displayed bid. In addition, a valid bid could
not exceed the asking price currently displayed to the market
(if one existed).
Similarly, sellers were allowed at any time to submit asks to sell
a single unit of the fictitious commodity. Analogous to bids,
asks had to follow an “improvement” rule, that is, in order for
the ask to be displayed to the market, it had to be lower than
the previously displayed ask. In addition, a valid ask could not
be lower than the bid price currently displayed to the market (if
one existed).
Any valid bid or ask was allowed to be submitted. The
experiment monitor conducted the auction and wrote bids and
asks on a blackboard which was visible to all participants.
Trades, along with seller and buyer identifications, were also
identified on the blackboard. A recorder recorded each bid, ask
and trade during the experiment. Since asks and bids were
made orally, the complete anonymity rule used in the
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computerized auctions of Phillips, Menkhaus and Krogmeier
(1997) was relaxed. Subjects were told that a bid (ask) was
valid only if it was displayed (repeated by the auctioneer and
written on the blackboard). For an aggressive group, it helped
to keep subjects from trying to negotiate a trade directly.
Individuals could make a trade by using one of two methods.
First, the buyer (seller) could submit a bid (ask) which equaled
the currently displayed “best” ask (bid). Second, the individual
could simply indicate that he/she accepted the currently
displayed “best” ask (bid).
During a typical session, the monitor first read the instructions.
This was followed by a brief practice session using redemption
values and costs which were different from those provided to
participants during the actual sessions. The practice session
was necessary to be sure that the subjects understood the
instructions. While the instructions were being read and during
the practice session, the subjects were permitted to ask
questions. Although this was a time-consuming process (about
one hour in the linked market sessions), this procedure seemed
to help make the instructions clearer to the participants.
At the beginning of each session, participants were told that the
double auction in a trading period would continue only until
there were no additional bids and asks, but in any case would
last no longer than 15 minutes. For most auctions, this was
ample time, although there were some periods which lasted a
little longer or less. In the beginning of a session, we stopped
the trading process after 15 minutes even if there were
subjects who wanted to continue trading. This seemed
necessary during early periods so that subjects would not
expand the trading time artificially. But during the later periods
we permitted an auction to last a little longer (without telling the
subjects about this) if some participants still wanted to make
trades. On the other hand, if no one was interested in
continuing trading, the monitor stopped the auction before the
15-minute time period was up.
The auctions for the forward and spot (in the linked design)
markets were conducted as described above. The only
difference between the forward and spot markets is the
production decision before the spot auction. Before the spot
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auction, each seller had to record the number of units he/she
wanted to produce for the spot market.
This completes the discussion of the basic design of the
experimental market and the way experiments were conducted.
We now focus on the experiment treatments. (Appendix C gives
an example of a buyer and seller instruction and of the record
sheets used in the LCF experiments.) We conducted three
replications of each of the following six treatments:
• forward only market – production-to-demand – F;
• forward only market, with a 5% possibility of contract failure
– FCF(5);
• linked forward/spot market – L;
• linked forward/spot market, with a 5% possibility of contract
failure –LCF(5);
• linked forward/spot market, with a 50% possibility of
contract failure – LCF(50);
• linked forward/spot market, with a 50% possibility of a
transaction cost of 10 tokens for a contract – LTC(50;10).
Forward only market. The forward market is a production-to-
demand design. A trade in a forward market means that the
seller agrees to produce a unit for a buyer and the buyer
agrees to pay the seller for that unit. All of this occurs before
the unit has actually been produced. There is no over-
production in such a market.
The treatment was almost the same as in Krogmeier et al.
(1996), with one exception: the authors utilized a computerized
double auction, while we used an oral double auction. A session
started with a procedure which determined randomly who would
be buyers and who would be sellers. This was done by picking
“balls” out of a “box”. There were eight balls in the box,
numbered from 1 to 8. Those participants who picked out the
balls with numbers from 1 to 4 were buyers, while those picking
balls 5 to 8 were sellers. These numbers were the IDs of the
participants, and the participants were placed around the room
according to their numbers. Thus, the number and the
identification of the buyers and sellers were common
knowledge.
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The monitor then read the instructions and conducted the
practice session. Usually, this took about a half-hour in the
forward only market (and an hour in the linked market). Then
the actual redemption value and cost information was
distributed among the participants. They were told not to share
the information and not to talk with each other. This was
facilitated by recruiting subjects from different groups of
university students, so that most of them had not known each
other before the session. Participants learned market
information (except individual redemption values and unit costs)
by the observation of bids, asks, trading prices, and the
number of trades in the laboratory market.
Forward only market with contract failure. This treatment
differed from the forward only market because of the
incorporation of the possibility of a forward contract failure. This
was operationalized by the random determination of the
success or failure of each trade according to the selected
probability level of failure. The probability of a forward contract
failure (0.05 in our experiments) was known by the experiment
participants. After a trading period had been completed, 20
balls numbered 1 to 20 were placed in a box. Participants were
told that a contract failure would be associated with ball
number 1. Then one of the participants (or the monitor) picked
a ball out of the box for each trade made during the period.
The monitor announced the identities of the respective buyer
and seller and the trading price for each trade which had failed,
and the buyer and the seller noted the failed trades on their
record sheets. The number of failed trades and the identity of
the affected parties were therefore common knowledge. After
the failed trades had been determined, the participants
corrected their earnings, and a new period began.
Linked forward/spot market. The basic linked forward/spot
market design (developed in Phillips, Menkhaus and Krogmeier,
1997 and utilized in the present study) is illustrated in Figure 2.
Each trading cycle consists of a forward market and a spot
market. In a spot market sellers make a production decision
and have units ready (or in stock) to be sold. When the demand
is unknown, there is a possibility that too many or too few units
will be produced. The forward and spot markets are therefore
separated by a production period, during which sellers decide
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on the total number of units to be produced for the trading
cycle. They must, of course, produce at least as many units as
they have already sold in the forward market. Meanwhile,
during the production period, buyers are waiting for the spot
market to open. Information about the additional units produced
for the spot market is strictly private, and participants can learn
if there are units remaining only by observing the asks of
sellers. There was no provision for inventory carryover in the
initial design.
Each trading period in the linked market sessions of our
experiment consisted of the forward auction (up to 15 minutes),
production period (1-2 minutes) and the spot auction (up to 15
minutes). Since the number of units each subject was able to
transact in the linked market during a trading period was the
same as in the forward only market experiment (in the linked
market this amount could be divided between the two
auctions), the total time needed for a trading period did not
vary greatly between the F and L markets. Usually, a trading
period in the linked market sessions lasted about 20 minutes.
Linked forward/spot market with forward contract failure. In
these linked market experiments, there was a possibility that a
forward contract would fail. We ran three replications of this
Figure 2. Organization of Trading
PRODUCTION PERIOD
BUYERS (4): WAIT
FORWARD
MARKET
(Double
Auction)
SPOT
MARKET
(Double
Auction)
SELLERS (4): PRODUCE UNITS
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treatment with a 5% possibility of contract failure and three
replications with a 50% possibility of contract failure. It was
important to decide when participants should learn about the
trade failures, whether before or after they decided how many
units they wanted to produce for the spot market which
followed the forward market and the production period. In order
to reduce the complexity of the decision process, before the
production decision we identified which contracts failed. (The
process for the selection of failed trades was similar to that
described above for the FCF treatment.) The sellers, however,
were required to produce all the units they sold in the forward
market (both successful and failed).
In experiments with advance production, participants usually do
not know how many units are produced and are available for
trading. In our LCF experiments, however, the failed forward
trades (if any) were common knowledge, and it was obvious
that these units were available in the spot market (to make
information about failed trades confidential would be difficult in
an oral setting). Information about any additional units
produced only for the spot market was, of course, strictly
reserved.
Each trading period or cycle in the LCF market sessions of our
experiment consisted of the forward auction (up to 15 minutes),
the determination of failed forward trades (5-7 minutes), the
production period (1-2 minutes), and the spot auction (up to 15
minutes). Since the failed forward units were available for
retrading in the spot market, the total time needed for a trading
period was a little longer in the LCF sessions (especially with a
50% possibility of contract failure) than it was in the L sessions.
Usually, a trading period in the LCF(50) sessions lasted about
25 minutes.
Linked forward/spot market with possible transaction costs for
a contract. In these experiments, there was again a 50%
possibility for a contract to fail, but contract failure now meant
that both buyer and seller incurred a transaction cost of an
additional 10 tokens for the failed unit. Thus, the “failed” trade
was still valid, but the respective earnings of both the buyer and
the seller were reduced by 10 tokens each.
Risk preference assessment. In each of the 18 experimental
sessions, a choice experiment was administered to assess the
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risk attitudes of the individuals participating in the session
(Menkhaus et al., 1997). Recruits were asked to complete the
choice experiment before the market experiment began. This
experiment consisted of 19 games (see Appendix C). Each
game involved a choice between an Option A, which yielded 2.5
rubles (in all sessions, except F1, where it yielded 5 rubles) and
a risky Option B, which paid either 5 rubles, or 0 rubles (10
rubles or 0 rubles in F1). Option A remained the same in each
of the 19 games. In Option B the probability of winning 5 rubles
decreased monotonically from 95% (a chance of 19 in 20) in
the first choice game to 5% (a 1 in 20 chance) in the 19th
game.
Participants were instructed that only one of the 19 games
would be played after the market experiment was over, and the
choice of the game would be determined by the random draw
of a ball numbered between 1 and 19. The payment for Option
B (either 5 rubles, or 0 rubles) was then determined by the
random draw of a ball numbered between 1 and 20. The
earnings from the choice experiment were added to the
earnings from the market experiment.
The pattern of the choices made by a participant provides an
ordinal measure of the risk attitude of the participant. Risk
aversion is represented by the convexity or concavity of an
individual’s utility function when the individual is faced with a
choice between a risky payoff and a payoff with certainty. The
convexity or concavity of the utility function may be assessed,
in the context of the choice experiment, by identifying the last
game in which the participant chose the risky Option B before
switching from it to the safe Option A (Menkhaus et al., 1997).
Each subject was thus assigned a score from 1 to 19, with 1
the most risk averse and 19 the most risk seeking, while 10 was
risk neutral.
4.2. Data Analysis
The experiments yielded trade prices, the quantities traded and
the earnings of sellers and buyers. These data are analyzed
from two perspectives: graphical and statistical analyses. One
purpose of the statistical tests is to compare treatments in
terms of mean prices, quantities and earnings. The null and
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alternative hypotheses for treatments i and j are:
Ho: µi = µj for all i ≠ j
Ha: µi ≠ µj for all i ≠ j.
The nature of the price data and the average buyer (seller)
earnings data and the Central Limit Theorem allow us to use
the standard t-test for the statistical analyses. For the t-tests
we used mean prices (buyer or seller earnings) for the periods
6-8 in each replication. (Data for the last three periods were
considered in the statistical analysis to eliminate the learning
effect; see Friedman and Sunder, 1994, p. 39.) Thus, we had
nine observations for each treatment.
Since the assumption of normality for the quantity traded data
and for the market efficiency (total earnings) data is tenuous,
we used the nonparametric randomization (or permutation) test
for these data. (We should point out that in most cases the t-
test and the permutation test yielded the same results, but,
when this was not the case, the results of the permutation test
are taken as the more valid statistical test.) The permutation
test is based on the differences in the summed observations for
each of the treatments under investigation. In many cases the
permutation test is more sensitive than are other nonparametric
tests, for instance the Mann-Whitney test (Davis and Holt, 1933,
p. 548). For the permutation test we averaged the quantity
traded (earnings) for periods 6-8 of each replication. Thus, we
had nine observations for each treatment.
We conducted F tests for differences in the variance of prices,
the quantity traded and the earnings in alternative market
institutions. Again, we considered only data from the last three
periods to avoid a learning effect. The standard t-test was used
to determine the significance of the differences in the risk
preference scores from the choice experiment.
5. RESULTS
The results of the choice experiment to assess the risk
preferences of experiment participants are outlined. This is
followed by a presentation of the prices, quantities traded and
produced, and market efficiency measures which were
generated in the experiments conducted for each treatment.
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5.1. Risk Attitudes
The choice experiment results are discussed first because of
the importance of risk attitudes and the probable influence of
these attitudes on the laboratory market results. We realize that
we cannot make a complete study of the risk attitudes of
participants through this choice experiment, but we hope at
least to understand some tendencies in the risk preferences.
After the verification of normality using the χ2 -test, t-tests were
conducted to determine the significant difference from risk
neutral (a score of 10) for each group of sellers and buyers and
the significant difference in risk attitude scores between buyers
and sellers in each treatment and each replication (Table 2).
Buyers participating in the F (forward only) and LTC(50;10)
(linked, transaction cost) treatments and sellers participating in
the L (linked), LCF(5) (linked, 5% of contract failure), LCF(50)
(linked, 50% of contract failure), and LTC(50;10) (linked,
transaction cost) treatments displayed risk attitude scores
significantly lower than risk neutral. The risk attitude scores for
all other groups were not statistically different from risk neutral.
The overall mean score, however, was 8.56 (the standard
deviation is 3.37), suggesting a general tendency toward risk
aversion by the participants in the experiment.
The risk attitude scores were significantly different between
buyers and sellers in the F and L treatments (α = 0.1). In the F
treatment the risk attitude scores of the buyers were lower than
those of the sellers; in the L treatment the risk attitude scores
of the buyers were higher than those of the sellers. A
comparison within each replication reveals that the risk attitude
scores of the buyers were significantly higher than the risk
attitude scores of the sellers in the L3, LCF(5)3, and LCF(50)1
sessions.
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5.2. Prices
The mean prices and the standard deviations by period in each
of the 18 sessions are displayed in Table 1D of Appendix D.
Table 3 shows the mean prices averaged across the three
replications for each of the six treatments. If we consider the
forward only market treatments (reliable and with a 5%
probability of contract failure), the FCF(5) average mean prices
are slightly higher than the prices in the F treatment, although
not statistically significant. According to theory (see Formula
3.1.2), we would expect the trade prices to be higher in the
FCF(5) treatment than they are in the F treatment, although this
could be influenced by the relative risk aversion of buyers and
sellers.5
Table 3. The Average Mean Prices (tokens) in Different Markets by
Period
Treatment
F FCF
(5)
L LCF
(5)
LCF
(50)
LTC
(50;10)
Period
1 90.16 80.82 76.27 67.93 95.96 82.42
2 86.42 83.68 76.41 75.08 85.29 77.36
3 82.82 80.94 80.66 74.23 84.73 76.12
4 81.53 82.41 80.18 76.34 83.83 76.08
5 81.04 82.75 78.88 77.36 83.36 77.29
6 80.95 81.97 79.88 78.24 82.41 79.10
7 81.31 82.94 79.50 79.13 81.01 79.34
8 82.01 82.05 79.82 79.53 80.90 80.20
When the reliable forward market is linked with a spot market in
the L design, the mean prices are not significantly affected,
although in Table 3 the average mean L prices are slightly lower
than the F prices (statistically not significant). On the other
hand, the addition of a spot market to the forward market with
a 5% probability of contract failure results in lower mean prices.
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The average mean prices in the LCF(5) market are lower than
those in the F, FCF(5) and L markets. But only the difference
between the LCF(5) and the FCF(5) trade prices was found to
be statistically significant (α = 0.10). The fact that the LCF(5)
mean prices are lower than the FCF(5) mean prices and,
although not statistically significant, slightly lower than the F
and L prices is consistent with the results of the numerical
calculations based on the theoretical models (see Appendix B).
The addition of a spot market to the forward market with a 5%
probability of contract failure in the LCF(5) treatment provides
subjects with a possibility to retrade failed units and, thus,
reduces the risk associated with forward contract failure
(especially for sellers who have an opportunity in the LCF(5)
market to cover all or part of the production cost for the failed
unit). The reduced risk for a seller increases the quantity
traded, resulting in a lower LCF(5) price relative to the FCF(5)
price.
To understand more clearly why the average LCF(5) prices may
be lower than the F and L prices, we need to compare forward
and spot prices within the linked treatments and also consider
the quantity traded and efficiency. This is addressed later in the
paper. At this point, we suggest that the introduction of the 5%
probability of contract failure into the linked market involves a
contract failure risk cost for both buyer and seller. For a buyer
this makes the forward linked market less attractive than the
spot market, and buyers may want to reduce the forward price.
On the other hand, for a seller the spot market involves the risk
of inventory loss because of the uncertain spot price. In the
reliable linked market (L) some sellers transacted in the spot
market, but only limited trades were made in this market. In the
LCF(5) market some sellers, without any initial intention of
doing so, may be forced to transact in the spot market because
some forward trades have failed. Since sellers know this, they
may wish to make all possible trades forward (without leaving
any units for the spot market) and then to participate in spot
trading only if some trades fail. Thus, the forward market
becomes even more attractive for sellers as compared to the
no contract failure case, and, therefore, sellers may accept a
lower forward price. If most units in the LCF(5) market are
traded forward, this may result in a lower average price.
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Note that the overall risk attitude score of the sellers
participating in the LCF(5) treatment (a score of 8.00) was
found to be significantly different from the risk neutral score
(10.00). We should point out that mean prices were noticeably
lower in the LCF(5)3 session than they were in the other two
replications of the LCF(5) treatment, and this must have
contributed to the lower LCF(5) average prices. Interestingly,
LCF(5)3 was the only replication of this market type in which
the risk attitude scores of the sellers were significantly lower
than those of the buyers. This suggests that risk aversion may
have helped make sellers more aggressive in the LCF(5)
market.6
An increase in the probability of forward contract failure to 50%
seems to drive mean prices up. In Table 3, the LCF(50) mean
prices are higher than the L and LCF(5) mean prices, and the
differences are statistically significant (α = 0.10). Again, this is
consistent with the results of the numerical examples based on
the theory. This increase in mean price is logical. Since on
average about 50% of forward trades fail, the implicit costs of
transacting forward (contract failure risk cost7) for both buyers
and sellers increases. But for a seller, failure in the forward
market forces more units to the spot market, and sellers are
exposed to the risk of inventory loss because of an uncertain
spot price. Note that the average risk attitude score for sellers
in the LCF(50) treatment (8.25) was significantly lower than risk
neutral. This may result in a lower forward and total quantity
produced and supplied and, hence, in a higher price.
To understand more clearly what has happened as a result of
the forward contract failure probability (5% and 50%), we
compared the mean forward prices in different markets, the
mean spot prices in different linked markets, and, finally, the
forward and spot prices within each of the linked market
treatments (Table 4 and Appendix D, Figures D1 and D2 and
Table D2). The results of the comparison are summarized in
Tables 5 and 6. As expected from the theory, the difference in
the mean forward prices in the F and L markets is not
statistically significant, although the average mean L forward
prices are slightly lower than the F prices, according to Table 4.
Within the L treatment, the forward and spot mean prices are
likewise not significantly different.8
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Table 4. The Average Mean Forward and Spot Prices in Different
Linked Markets by Period (tokens)
Average Forward Price Average Spot Price
Treatment
L LCF LCF LTC L LCF LCF LTC
Period
(5) (50) (50;10) (5) (50) (50;10)
1 75.89 66.36 101.2 82.57 83.20 75.29 86.44 74.12
2 76.36 74.20 88.52 76.87 78.11 80.67 83.77 77.50
3 80.75 74.06 87.46 75.81 79.56 76.52 82.39 77.17
4 80.30 76.55 86.95 74.89 79.00 75.5 82.06 78.87
5 78.90 77.34 84.56 75.62 80.00 78.55 82.79 83.33
6 79.83 78.08 84.37 78.10 81.00 81.70 80.80 81.44
7 79.83 79.19 83.41 77.27 77.00 80.29 80.15 82.01
8 79.92 79.62 81.86 78.68 77.00 77.83 80.04 82.03
Table 5. A Comparison of Average Forward and Spot Prices across
Different Treatments
Average Forward Price Average Spot
Price
Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment
Under
Consideratio
n
F FCF
(5)
L LCF
(5)
LCF
(50)
L LCF
(5)
LCF
(50)
FCF(5) >
L < <
LCF(5) < << < >
LCF(50) ≈ ≈ >> >> ≈ ≈
LTC(50;10) << << << < << > ≈ >
> Denotes that the treatment under consideration generated average prices
which were higher than those generated by the control treatment.
< Denotes that the treatment under consideration generated average prices
which were lower than those generated by the control treatment.
≈ Denotes that it is not obvious which treatment generated the higher prices.
>> or << Denotes that the difference is statistically significant.
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Table 6. A Comparison of Average Forward and Spot Prices within
the Same Treatment
Forward Price Compared with Spot Price
L LCF(5) LCF(50) LTC(50;10)
≈ ≈ >> <<
≈, >> and << denote the same as in Table 5.
The LCF(5) forward mean prices are lower than the FCF(5)
forward prices (statistically significant, α = 0.10) and slightly
lower (not a statistically significant difference) than the L
forward prices, which is consistent with the theoretical
predictions. Within the LCF(5) treatment, the mean forward and
spot prices were not significantly different.
Raising the probability of forward contract failure (from 5% to
50%) resulted in an (statistically significant, α = 0.02) increase
in the LCF(50) forward prices relative to the LCF(5) forward
prices. The LCF(50) forward prices are also (statistically
significant, α = 0.10) higher than the L forward prices. Within
the LCF(50) treatment, the mean forward prices are higher than
the spot prices (statistically significant, α = 0.10). This suggests
that the high (50%) probability of contract failure results in a
higher forward price, which may be caused by a decrease in
the forward quantity traded. Buyers accept the higher forward
price in order to increase the total quantity produced. Failed
units (that is, about half the units traded in the forward LCF(50)
market) are supplied in the spot market, along with those units
which were produced purposely for the spot market. Of course,
the demand unfilled as a result of the failed forward trades is
present in the spot market as well. Even knowing this, sellers
become more aggressive in the spot market (accepting lower
spot prices) because they need to sell all the units produced.
Nonetheless, the LCF(50) spot price is not significantly different
from (and, according to Table 4 and Figure D2, is sometimes
even higher than) the L and LCF(5) spot prices. Because of the
fact that the average spot price in the LCF(50) market is lower
than the average forward price, most failed units are retraded
spot at a lower price.
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The situation is completely different when an explicit additional
transaction cost of 10 tokens for each failed forward trade is
substituted for an implicit transaction cost (contract failure risk
cost). The LTC(50;10) mean prices are significantly (α = 0.10)
lower than the LCF(50) mean prices and are not significantly
different from the L or the LCF(5) mean prices. To understand
this situation, we again need to consider the forward and spot
mean prices. Consistent with the numerical examples based on
the theory, the LTC(50;10) forward prices are lower than the
spot prices (statistically significant, α = 0.02). In fact, the
LTC(50;10) average mean forward prices are lower than the
forward prices under any other treatment, and these
differences are significant (α = 0.10), except for the difference
between the LTC(50;10) and LCF(5) forward mean prices. On
the other hand, according to the later periods in Table 4, the
LTC(50;10) spot prices are higher than the spot prices in other
linked markets (although not statistically significant). This
suggests that buyers were compensating for the possible
explicit transaction cost through a lower price in the forward
market, while sellers tried to compensate for it through a higher
price in the spot market. For a buyer the forward LTC(50;10)
market is risky and the spot market is not. A buyer agrees to
buy in the forward LTC(50;10) market only if the risk cost is
offset by a lower price. On the other hand, for a seller both the
forward and the spot LTC(50;10) markets are risky: the risk of
an additional transaction cost in the forward market and the risk
of an inventory loss in the spot market. If a seller wants to trade
forward, she has to accept a lower price offered by the buyers.
This makes the forward market even less attractive for the
sellers. But the risk of loss in the spot market forces the sellers
to sell some units forward, thus diversifying between the two
markets. This activity is likely to decrease the total quantity
produced, resulting in a higher price in the LTC(50;10) spot
market.
The results of tests of the price variances related to different
treatments suggest that the price variance in the F market was
the highest (statistically significant everywhere, α = 0.002). The
second highest was the price variance in the FCF(5) market
(statistically significant everywhere, α = 0.002). The price
variance in the LTC(50;10) market is not significantly different
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from that in the LCF(5) market, but is higher than that in the
LCF(50) market (α = 0.01). On the other hand, the price
variances in the LCF(5) and LCF(50) markets are not
significantly different. Finally, the price variance in the LCF(5)
market is significantly higher than that in the L market (α =
0.01), although the latter is not significantly different from the
price variance in the LCF(50) market.
The order of price variance magnitudes changes somewhat if
we compare the price differences in the respective forward
markets. In this case, the price variances in the F and FCF(5)
markets are again the first and the second highest, respectively
(statistically significant everywhere, α = 0.002). But the third
highest is the price variance in the forward LCF(5) market. It is
significantly higher than the price variances in the LCF(50), L
and LTC (50;10) forward markets (α = 0.02, 0.002 and 0.002,
respectively). The last three are not significantly different from
each other.
Among the linked spot markets, the price variances in the L and
LTC(50;10) spot markets are not significantly different, but both
are higher than the spot price variance in the LCF(50) market
(α = 0.10 and 0.002, respectively). This last is significantly
higher than the spot price variance in the LCF(5) market (α =
0.02), this being the lowest spot price variance among all the
linked markets.
A comparison of the forward and spot price variances within
each of the linked treatments suggests that the forward prices
are more variable than the spot prices in the LCF(5) market (α
= 0.002) and that the spot prices are more variable than the
forward prices in the L and LTC(50;10) markets (α = 0.10 and
0.002, respectively). In the LCF(50) market the difference
between the forward and spot price variances is not statistically
significant.
5.3. The Quantity Traded and Produced
The quantities traded and produced in the different markets
according to treatment and replication are displayed in Table
D3, Appendix D. The average total quantities traded in the
different markets (valid transactions without failed trades) are
displayed in Table 7. The average total quantities traded in the
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F, L and LCF(5) markets are within the predicted competitive
range (20-24 units). The total quantities traded in periods 1 and
2 in the LCF(50) market and also in periods 3 through 5 in the
LTC(50;10) market are below the competitive range. In the
FCF(5) market the average total quantities traded (valid
transactions) are below the competitive range in five of the
eight periods. The number of valid transactions in the FCF(5)
market is the smallest (statistically significant everywhere),
which is reasonable since in this treatment failed forward trades
could not be retraded. The random nature of contract failure
contributes to the variability in this quantity series from period
to period.
Table 7. The Average Total Quantity Traded in Different Markets by
Period
(valid transactions)
Treatment F FCF
(5)
L LCF
(5)
LCF
(50)
LTC
(50;10)
Period
1 21.33 20.67 23.00 21.00 17.00 23.00
2 20.30 18.67 22.33 22.33 19.67 20.67
3 21.00 20.33 22.33 22.00 20.00 19.67
4 21.00 18.00 22.33 22.00 21.00 19.00
5 21.00 20.00 21.67 21.67 20.67 19.67
6 21.00 19.00 21.33 21.00 20.67 20.33
7 21.67 19.67 21.33 21.33 20.00 20.00
8 21.67 18.67 21.67 21.67 21.67 20.00
The average total quantities were noticeably higher in the L and
LCF(5) treatments than they were in the F treatment up to
period 6. This suggests that the addition of a spot market to the
forward market increased the total quantity traded in early
periods. This may be due to the advanced production in the
linked spot market.9 In periods 6 through 8 the total quantities
traded in the F, L and LCF(5) markets were not significantly
different. This is consistent with the numerical examples based
41
on the theoretical models and suggests that the low level of
forward contract failure probability (5%) did not result in a
decrease in the total quantity. When the probability of contract
failure is raised to 50%, the total quantity traded becomes
slightly (not significantly) lower than it is in the F market and
significantly lower that it is in the L (α = 0.10) market. This is
consistent with the higher mean price level in the LCF(50)
treatment and confirms our hypothesis that the high probability
of contract failure leads to a reduced total quantity. In Table 7,
the total quantity traded in the LCF(50) market is also mostly
below that in the LCF(5) market, but the difference is not
statistically significant. According to the data presented in the
table, the total quantity traded in the LTC(50;10) market is
slightly lower than that traded in the LCF(5) and LCF(50)
markets (which is consistent with the numerical examples) and
is slightly higher than that traded in the FCF(5) market; though
these differences are not statistically significant. However, the
total quantity traded in the LTC(50;10) market is significantly
lower than that traded in the F and L markets (α = 0.10).
Once more, we compare the quantity traded forward and spot
under different treatments to understand more clearly the
impact of contract failure (Table 8 and Appendix D, Table D3
and Figure D3). The results of the comparison are summarized
in Table 9. For treatments such as FCF(5), LCF(5), LCF(50),
and LTC(50;10), the quantity traded forward includes failed
trades. The actual number of failed trades varied considerably
from period to period: from none to four trades within the
FCF(5) and LCF(5) treatments and from three to 17 in the
LCF(50) and LCF(50;10) treatments. In all, 5.3% of the forward
trades failed in the FCF(5) market, 4.7% in the LCF(5) market,
55.4% in the LCF(50) market, and 54.9% in the LTC(50;10)
market.
The average forward quantity traded in Table 8 reflects a
willingness of the subjects to trade in respective forward
markets, even though they know that some trades may fail
later. According to the table, the highest quantity traded
forward is that in the F market. The quantity traded forward is
significantly lower in the LCF(50) and LTC(50;10) markets than
it is in the F market (α = 0.10). The quantities traded forward in
the L and LCF(5) markets are not significantly different from the
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quantity traded in the F market, and this is consistent with the
theory and the numerical examples, although this could be
Table 8. The Average Quantity Traded Forward and Spot in Different
Markets
(with failed trades)
Average Quantity Produced for
Forward Trades
Average Quantity
Produced Spot and
Traded Spot
Treatment F FCF L LCF LCF LTC L LCF LCF LTC
Period
(5) (5) (50) (50;10) (5) (50) (50;10)
1 21.33 20.67 20.67 18.00 15.00 19.33 2.33 3.00 3.67 3.67
2 20.33 20.33 20.00 20.33 16.00 17.33 2.33 2.00 3.67 3.33
3 21.00 20.67 20.00 20.00 17.00 16.33 2.33 2.00 3.00 3.33
4 21.00 19.67 20.33 20.67 18.67 14.33 2.00 1.33 2.33 4.67
5 21.00 20.67 19.67 19.33 16.67 14.00 2.00 2.33 4.00 5.67
6 21.00 20.67 20.33 16.33 18.33 14.33 1.00 4.67 2.33 6.00
7 21.67 20.67 20.00 20.00 19.33 11.00 1.33 1.33 0.67 9.00
8 21.67 20.33 21.00 20.33 18.00 10.00 0.67 1.33 3.67 10.00
Table 9. A Comparison of Average Forward and Spot Quantities across
Different Treatments
Average Quantity Produced for
Forward Trades
Average Quantity
Produced Spot and
Traded Spot
Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment
Under
Consideration
F FCF
(5)
L LCF
(5)
LCF
(50)
L LCF
(5)
LCF
(50)
FCF(5) <
L < ≈
LCF(5) < < < ≈
LCF(50) << << << ≈ ≈ ≈
LTC(50;10) << << << << << >> >> >>
≈, <, >>, and << denote the same as in Table 5.
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influenced by the risk attitudes of some participants.10 We
would expect from the theory that the quantity traded forward
would be lower in the FCF(5) market than it is in the F market.
Although this difference was not statistically significant, we
noticed during the experiment that, as a result of the possibility
of contract failure, a seller would often reject trading a marginal
unit because the failure of the trade could generate a large loss
(the production cost is large).11
The quantities traded forward in the FCF(5), L and LCF(5)
markets are not significantly different from each other, although
from the theory we might have expected the quantity in the
FCF(5) market to be lower than the quantities in the other two
markets. The addition of a spot market and a 5% possibility of
forward contract failure did not make trading forward less
attractive for subjects. Forward trading becomes less attractive
for subjects when the probability of contract failure is 50%: the
quantity traded forward in the LCF(50) treatment is lower than
that in each of the F, FCF(5) and L treatments (statistically
significant, α = 0.10). In most periods (period 6 is an
exception), the average quantity traded forward is also lower in
the LCF(50) market than it is in the LCF(5) market, which is
consistent with the numerical examples, although this
difference is not statistically significant. The lower level of the
quantity traded forward corresponds to a higher forward price
level in the LCF(50) market relative to the other treatments (see
Figure D1).12
When an additional cost of 10 tokens (keeping the 50%
probability) was substituted for the need to retrade failed units
spot, the forward trades decreased greatly. The quantity traded
forward is significantly lower in the LTC(50;10) market than it is
in any other market (α = 0.10). From the numerical examples
based on theory, we would have expected a reduction in the
quantity traded forward in the LTC(50;10) market relative to the
other treatments, although the degree of the real reduction is
higher.13 This drop in forward trades does not generate a
higher forward price in the LTC(50;10) market since buyers are
also affected by the high probability of additional transaction
costs. They agree to trade forward only if the forward price is
sufficiently low. Thus, buyers and sellers both move some of
their trades from the forward market to the spot market.
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Figure D3 in Appendix D shows the ratio of the units produced
to be traded spot (and actually traded spot) to the total quantity
transacted in different linked markets. In the LCF(5) and
LCF(50) treatments, more units than the total shown in Figure
D3 were supplied in the spot market, because some units were
traded twice: first in the forward market and then, after failure
there, in the spot market. But the figure shows the relative
attractiveness of the spot market for subjects in different linked
treatments. This can also be seen in Table 8, which displays the
average quantities produced and traded spot in different linked
markets. The forward market dominated in every linked market
treatment. The figure suggests that the relative attractiveness
of the spot market was the least in the L treatment, although
the quantities produced for spot trading in the L, LCF(5) and
LCF(50) markets are not significantly different. The numerical
examples based on the theory indicate that there should not be
any spot production in the L or the LCF(5) markets. However, in
the experiments, the quantity produced to be traded in the spot
market was generally about 8% of the total quantity produced
in a period in the L market (one or two units) and about 10% of
the total quantity produced (two units) in the LCF(5) market. In
period 8 these ratios became 3% and 6%, respectively.14 The
existence of spot production in these linked markets may have
been caused by sellers who were taking the risk of an uncertain
spot price and trying to take advantage (by increasing the spot
price) of low supply levels in the spot market. On the other
hand, the results of our experiments suggest that a 5% level of
contract failure does not affect appreciably the mix of trading
activity between the forward and spot markets in the linked
design.15
According to the numerical examples, the desire to produce
and trade spot rises with the increase in the probability of
contract failure to 50%. In our LCF(50) experiments, in general,
14% of the total quantity produced (two or three units)
represented spot production. This is a very modest increase
(from 10% to 14%) relative to the tenfold increase in the
probability of contract failure (from 5% to 50%). But this is
consistent with the numerical calculations. Adding a 10 token
cost for each failed forward trade instead of the need to
retrade failed units boosted the spot production to 29% overall
and to 50% in the later periods. The quantity produced and
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traded spot in the LTC(50;10) market is higher than that in any
other linked treatment (statistically significant, α = 0.10). The
higher spot quantity in the LTC(50;10) market relative to other
linked markets is consistent with the numerical examples based
on the theoretical models, but, again, the increase in the spot
quantity in our experiments was much higher than we would
have expected from the theory.
Another interesting observation from the spot market within all
the linked market treatments and replications is that in all
sessions and all periods only two units were produced but not
sold (one unit in period 4 of session LCF(5)3 and the other unit
in period 1 of session LTC(50;10)2). For a spot market,
because of advance production, some units may be produced
but not sold. Krogmeier, et al. (1996) studied the spot market
as a separate treatment (without any linkage to a forward
market) with the same supply-demand schedule as we have,
but in a computerized setting. In those experiments, a total of
26 units went unsold. This represented 2.9% of the total of 911
units produced in three spot market sessions. The fact that in
our linked market sessions only two units produced for the spot
market went unsold (and even these could have been sold
easily if the sellers had been willing to take a little loss) can be
explained by the information which subjects obtain by observing
forward trading. The forward market, even in early periods,
offers sellers a price range and, thus, gives them some
orientation about the quantity to produce. During all replications
of the L treatment, only eight units in total were produced
beyond the competitive range, and all of these units were
produced by seller 8 in the L4 session (the risk attitude score of
this seller was 10). During the three LCF(5) sessions, only four
units were produced beyond the competitive range. We think
that this was because of the price information supplied by the
forward linked market.
5.4. Market Efficiency
Market efficiency can be measured as the share of the total
surplus available that is extracted in any one period as buyer
and seller earnings. The analysis of earnings focuses on the
way the market type and the risk affect the distribution of
earnings between buyers and sellers, as well as the total
surplus obtained by buyers and sellers together. The supply
and demand schedules (Figure 1) provide each subject an
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equal opportunity to earn 150 tokens in each period, and all
subjects in total could earn 1,200 tokens in a period.16
Table 10.  The Average Total Earnings (tokens) in Different Markets by
Period
Treatment F FCF L LCF LCF LTC
Period
(5) (5) (50) (50;10)
1 1186.67 1143.33 1185.00 1189.00 1096.67 966.67
2 1186.67 933.33 1193.33 1193.33 1163.00 1013.33
3 1186.67 1133.33 1195.33 1160.00 1174.00 1010.00
4 1200.00 980.00 1190.00 1166.67 1193.33 1020.00
5 1176.67 1100.00 1190.00 1146.67 1156.67 1000.00
6 1200.00 986.67 1193.33 1196.00 1192.67 1000.00
7 1200.00 1083.33 1196.67 1196.67 1180.67 1110.00
8 1196.67 996.67 1200.00 1200.00 1200.00 1053.33
In the F, L and LCF(5) markets agent earnings (averaged for
the three replications for periods 6-8) are 99.91%, 99.72% and
99.80% of the available surpluses, respectively (Table 10 and
Figure D4 in Appendix D). The average total earnings in these
three treatments are therefore about equal (the difference is
not statistically significant), reflecting nearly equal prices and
quantities. If all the units traded in the FCF(5) market had been
successful, market efficiency would have been 98.87%, but the
failed trades reduced the extracted surplus to 85.19%. Thus,
the total surplus was reduced on average by about 15%, with
an average of 5% of the contracts failing in the FCF(5) market.
Total earnings are significantly lower in the FCF(5) markets than
they are in all other treatments (α = 0.10), except for
LTC(50;10).
The total earnings in the LCF(50) market (Table 10) are 99.26%
of the available surpluses, and this is not significantly different
from the F, L and LCF(5) markets. In the LTC(50;10) market,
the total earnings are only 87.87% of the available surpluses.
This is significantly (α = 0.10) lower than the share in any other
market, except for FCF(5). Thus, adding a 10 token cost for
each failed forward trade reduces the total surpluses by more
than 10%.
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Mean buyer and seller earnings by session and period are
displayed in Table D4 of Appendix D. The average earnings for
a buyer and a seller across market types are displayed in Table
11 and illustrated in Figures D5 and D6 in Appendix D. The
results of the comparison across market types are also
summarized in Table 12. The average buyer earnings in the F
and L markets are not significantly different, since quantities
and prices were also not significantly different. Adding a 5%
probability of contract failure to the forward only market yields
buyer earnings which are slightly lower than those in the F
treatment and significantly lower than those in each of the L,
LCF(5) and LCF(50) treatments (α = 0.05). On the other hand,
the addition of a 5% probability of contract failure to the linked
design does not change buyer earnings significantly relative to
the F and L markets.
Table 12. A Comparison of Average Buyer and Seller Earnings across
Different Treatments
Average Buyer
Earnings
Average Seller Earnings
Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment
Under
Consideration
F FCF
(5)
L LCF
(5)
LCF
(50)
F FCF
(5)
L LCF
(5)
LCF
(50)
FCF(5) < <<
L > >> < >>
LCF(5) > >> > < > <
LCF(50) ≈ >> < << ≈ >> > >
LTC(50;10) < > << << << << ≈ << << <<
Note: ≈, >, <, >>, and << denote the same as in Table 5.
Raising the probability of contract failure to 50% resulted in a
slight (not statistically significant) reduction in buyer earnings in
the LCF(50) treatment relative to those in the L market and to a
significant reduction relative to those in the LCF(5) market (α =
0.10). This is consistent with the higher price and the lower
quantity in the LCF(50) market compared to the L and LCF(5)
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markets (see Tables 3 and 7). It should be noted that the actual
buyer earnings (that is, calculated using the spot price for the
retrade units which failed in the forward market) are higher than
the buyer earnings calculated using the initial forward prices for
failed forward trades. This was a result of the lower spot prices
compared to the forward prices in the LCF(50) market.
The buyer earnings are significantly lower in the LTC(50;10)
market than they are in the L and LCF(50) markets (α = 0.10)
and slightly (not significantly) lower than they are in the LCF(5)
market. This reduction can be attributed to both the additional
transaction costs for the failed units and the reduction in the
total quantity traded.
The average seller earnings seem to be the highest in the F
market. In the L market the average seller earnings are slightly
lower, although this difference is not statistically significant. The
addition of a 5% probability of contract failure has varying
effects on the average seller earnings in the forward only
market and in the linked market (Table 12). In the former, the
seller earnings decreased significantly (α = 0.10), this being, of
course, the result of the failed contracts and the respective
uncovered sunk costs. In the LCF(5) market, the drop in the
average seller earnings relative to those in the L market was
due to the slightly lower price and was not statistically
significant.
When the probability of contract failure increased to 50%, seller
earnings also increased, becoming slightly (not significantly)
higher than they were in the L and LCF(5) markets (Table 12
and Figure D6). Because the quantity traded in the LCF(50)
market was lower than that traded in the L and LCF(5) markets,
the rise in seller earnings was caused by the relatively higher
prices. The seller earnings calculated using the initial forward
prices for the failed units were even higher than those actually
received after the retrading of failed units in the spot market.
The seller earnings are significantly lower in the LTC(50;10)
market than they are in the F market (α = 0.02) and all other
linked markets. Again, this may be due to the added
transaction costs for the failed units and the reduction in the
total quantity traded.
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Table 13. A Comparison of Average Buyer and Seller Earnings within
the Same Treatment
Buyer Earnings Compared to Seller Earnings
F FCF(5) L LCF(5) LCF(50) LTC(50;
10)
< ≈ > >> << ≈
Note: ≈, >, >>, and << denote the same as Table 5.
Thus, from the standpoint of both the sellers and the buyers the
FCF(5) and LTC(50;10) markets are the least desirable of all
the market types under consideration. Buyers tend to fare
better in the L and LCF(5) markets, and sellers tend to fare
better in the F and LCF(50) markets (although the earnings in
the F and L markets are not significantly different for buyers or
for sellers).
An evaluation of the average earnings for a buyer and a seller
within the same treatment (Tables 11 and 13) suggests that the
sellers earned significantly more than did the buyers in the
LCF(50) market, but the buyers earned significantly more than
the sellers in the LCF(5) market (α = 0.10). For other markets,
buyer and seller earnings were not significantly different.
We also compared the variances in the earnings in different
markets. Total earnings are most variable in the FCF(5) market
(statistically significant relative to other treatments, except for
the LTC(50;10) treatment). The second highest is the total
earnings variance in the LTC(50;10) market, and the third
highest variance is in the LCF(50) market. This last is
significantly higher than the total earnings variances in the L,
LCF(5) and F markets, these not being significantly different
from each other.
The buyer earnings variances in the FCF(5) and F markets are
not significantly different, but both are significantly higher than
the variances in all other markets. The variance in the buyer
earnings in the LTC(50;10) market is not significantly different
from that in the LCF(5) market, but it is significantly higher than
those in the L and LCF(50) markets. The variance in the LCF(5)
market is not significantly different from the variance in the L
market, but it is significantly higher than that in the LCF(50)
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market. Finally, the variances in the L and LCF(50) markets are
not significantly different.
The seller earnings variance is the highest in the FCF(5) market
(significantly different relative to other treatments). The second
highest is the seller earnings variance in the F market, this not
being significantly different from the variance in the LTC(50;10)
market. This last is significantly higher than the seller earnings
variances in the LCF(5), LCF(50) and L markets, these not
being significantly different from each other.
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The results of the economic models developed in this paper
suggest that, in the presence of a risk associated with contract
failure in a forward only market (FCF), a risk averse producer is
likely to reduce output, resulting in a higher price compared to
the no contract failure case (F). If the forward market with
contract failure generates a profit for which the certainty
equivalent is lower than the certain income in a vertical
integration case, a producer is motivated to integrate vertically.
In the case of a reliable linked forward/spot market (L), for a
producer to be indifferent in the choice between the forward
and spot markets, the spot price must be higher than the
forward price. This is because of the cost associated with the
risk of inventory loss in the spot market. Economic theory
predicts that in the linked market a seller will trade all units in
the forward market, and the forward price will be the same as it
is in the case of a reliable forward only market (F).
In the case of a linked forward/spot market with possible
forward contract failure (LCF), the risk of a contract failure
increases the costs for a seller of transacting in both the
forward and the spot linked markets. Theoretical models
suggest that, if the probability of a forward contract failure is
small (5%), risk aversion forces the agents to transact more in
the forward linked market. Relative to both the reliable forward
only market (F) and the reliable linked (L) market, the forward
quantity tends to be higher, while the forward price tends to be
lower. There should be no spot production, although the spot
price should be higher than the forward price. (Note that, even
though there is no spot production, there still could be spot
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trades involving retraded units which have failed in the forward
market. Thus, there could be a spot price.) A tenfold increase
in the probability of a forward contract failure (50%) reduces
the forward quantity, though only by a very small amount, and
prompts some spot production. The spot market serves as a
sort of insurance mechanism for the retrading of failed forward
units. The forward quantity is slightly lower in this case than it is
in the reliable forward only market (F) or the linked (L) market.
Risk aversion forces the forward prices and the spot prices to
be higher than they are in the case of a 5% probability of
forward contract failure (and also higher than they are in the F
and L markets), and the spot price is still higher than the
forward price. These results, however, are affected by the
relative risk aversion of sellers and buyers.
In the case of a linked market with a possible transaction cost
associated with a failed forward trade (LTC), a producer’s
preference for a forward market or a spot market depends on
the value of the sum of the expected transaction cost and the
transaction cost risk in the forward market compared to the
cost associated with the risk of inventory loss in the spot
market. The numerical results suggest that, when there is a
50% probability of an additional transaction cost of 10 tokens
for a failed forward trade for both sellers and buyers, subjects
still prefer to transact most units in the forward market. The
quantity traded forward, however, is less than it is in the linked
market (L) or the linked with contract failure (LCF) market. Risk
aversion forces the quantity traded in the forward LTC market
to decrease and the quantity traded spot to increase, while the
prices in the forward and the spot linked markets are expected
to be higher, with the spot price higher than the forward price.
For the same level of risk aversion, the forward and the spot
prices in the LTC(50;10) market are a little higher compared to
the prices in the linked market with a 50% probability of forward
contract failure (LCF(50)). As in the case of the linked market
with forward contract failure, these results are affected by the
relative risk aversion of sellers and buyers. For each of the
linked market cases, if none of the forward or spot linked
markets generates a profit for which a certainty equivalent is
higher than the certain income in a vertical integration case, a
producer is motivated to integrate vertically.
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The predictions based on the theoretical models were
generally confirmed by the data obtained from the laboratory
experiments. The experimental results suggest that, when
there is a forward only market, even a low probability of
contract failure (5%) leads to a reduced quantity traded and to
a slightly increased average price. The total earnings are
reduced on average by about 15% and become much more
variable, with seller earnings affected more than buyer
earnings.
Linking a reliable forward market with a spot market reduces
forward trades, since some units are traded spot (less than
10% of the total quantity traded in the linked market).
However, this does not cause a significant change in the
average price or the total quantity traded or a significant
difference between the forward and the spot mean prices. The
average total earnings and both buyer and seller earnings are
likewise not significantly affected. However, buyer and seller
earnings are less variable in the reliable linked market than
they are in the reliable forward market.
The incorporation of a low (5%) probability of forward contract
failure into the linked design does not affect the market
significantly with respect to the reliable case. The variables
under consideration (that is, the average price, the forward
price, the spot price, the forward quantity traded, the spot
quantity produced, total earnings, and the average buyer and
seller earnings) were not significantly different from the
corresponding variables in the reliable linked market case.
On the other hand, compared to the unreliable forward only
market, in the linked market with the same (5%) probability of
contract failure, the average price is significantly lower and the
total amount of valid transactions is significantly higher and
much less variable. As a result, the total earnings and both the
buyer and the seller earnings are significantly higher and less
variable in the case of the linked design than they are in the
forward only market when both have a low probability of
contract failure.
The linked market is affected significantly when the probability
of contract failure is high (50%). In this case, the total quantity
traded becomes significantly lower and the average price
becomes significantly higher than they are in the reliable linked
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market case. The forward quantity traded is also reduced
because of the high probability of contract failure, resulting in a
forward price which is higher than it is in the case of the
reliable linked market. At the same time, the high probability of
contract failure does not appreciably affect spot prices relative
to the reliable linked market case; this means that the forward
price is significantly higher than the spot price in the linked
market with a high probability of contract failure. Yet, the total
earnings in the linked market with a high probability of contract
failure are not significantly different either from those in the
reliable linked market case, or from those in the reliable
forward only market case. The buyer earnings are slightly
reduced as a result of the high probability of contract failure,
but the seller earnings are about the same as they are in the
reliable linked market. The fact that the forward linked market
remains dominant even when the probability of contract failure
is high suggests that sellers consider the spot market very
risky, although the spot market is important as a residual
market. This confirms the hypothesis that a high probability of
contract failure results in increased vertical integration.
If failed contracts in the forward market are assessed an
additional transaction cost of 10 tokens (instead of allowing
failed units to be retraded in the spot market) and if the
probability of contract failure is high (50%), the linked market
is greatly affected. In this case, the total quantity traded is
significantly lower than it is in the reliable linked market. This
reduction is due to the lower number of units traded in the
forward market. Spot production is much higher than it is in the
case of the reliable linked market or the linked market with
contract failure. Although the average price is about the same
as it is in the reliable linked market, a possible transaction cost
affects the forward and the spot prices. The forward price
becomes significantly lower as a result of a downward shift in
the forward demand. But the spot price becomes slightly
higher than it is in the reliable linked market; this is caused by
the reduced total production. As a result of the high probability
of an additional transaction cost in the forward market, the
total earnings are reduced greatly and exhibit more variability.
The buyer and the seller earnings are about equal, and both
are much lower than they are in the reliable linked market or in
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the linked markets with contract failure with the option of
retrading in the spot market.
The above results suggest that, if there is no spot market, even
a low probability of contract failure may create a strong
motivation for both the buyer and the seller to integrate
vertically. Because a 5% possibility of contract failure reduces
total earnings by about 15%, subjects may choose to integrate
vertically even if this does not increase earnings up to 100% of
the available surplus. (Vertical integration is likely to be less
efficient than is the reliable forward market as a result of
bureaucratic costs, changing incentives and so on; see
Williamson, 1989.) The motivation to integrate vertically is likely
to be stronger among more risk averse producers.
The existence of a spot market linked to the forward market
with contract failure renders the motivation to integrate
vertically much weaker. In the case of a low probability of
contract failure, the total earnings are almost equal to the
available surplus, and both buyer and seller earnings are not
significantly different from those in the case of a reliable linked
market. Thus, if there is a linked market with a low probability
of contract failure, the motivation to integrate vertically is very
weak.
Vertical integration is likely to increase as the probability of
contract failure becomes high (50%). The total earnings in this
case are still more than 99% of the available surplus, but are
quite variable. Buyers might be particularly interested in
vertical integration since the high probability of contract failure
cuts into their earnings. Sellers, especially those who are
strongly risk averse, may also prefer to integrate vertically so
as to avoid the risks. Again, the benefits of vertical integration
must offset the costs.
The motivation to integrate vertically may be much stronger if
the failed contracts in the forward market are subject to an
additional transaction cost so that one may not simply retrade
the failed units with no explicit cost. Since a 50% probability of
a cost of an additional 10 tokens for each forward trade
reduces total earnings by about 10% and since buyer and
seller earnings are both affected about equally, buyers and
sellers each have an incentive to integrate vertically. In this
case, for vertical integration not to occur the cost of vertical
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integration must be considerably higher than it is in the case of
the linked market with contract failure and with the option of
retrading spot.
Overall, the results of the analyses conducted in this research
seem to suggest that if legal institutions are not in place to
enforce contracts between buyers and sellers in forward
trading, a viable spot market is essential. The spot market acts
as an insurance mechanism for forward trades, and the forward
markets remain dominant, even though there may be high
contract failure. The incentive to integrate vertically, however, is
increased when contract failure is prevalent, particularly if real
costs are associated with the failed units. This conclusion is
consistent with transaction cost economics, which posits,
ceteris paribus, that the vertical coordination of the various
stages of a production, processing and distribution chain will be
carried out in the most efficient manner in terms of transaction
costs (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1989). Increased vertical
integration, however, has the potential of making the spot
market thin.
Further evidence is available from the agricultural and food
markets in Russia today. Contractual obligations are often not
fulfilled (entirely or in part) as a result of exogenous forces
rather than the opportunism of the parties. (For example, state
procurement organizations sometimes do not receive the
expected funds from a state budget in a timely manner, or
processors often cannot pay for inputs because they have not
received payment for the output they have already produced.)
Thus, parties must often break initial contracts or incur
additional costs so as to enforce transactions (for instance,
considerable time delays in receiving payments). But the risk of
inventory loss in the evolving spot market or the thinness of the
spot market prevents firms from relying on the spot market
instead of the unreliable forward market. As a result, producers
have started to expand processing facilities. This has led to a
significant dropoff in the amount of the products delivered to
specialized processing firms (up to 30-40% in 1997) (Õëûñòóí,
1997). This creates inefficiencies, since plants are not being
used to capacity, and has induced many processing firms to
initiate integration-like contractual arrangements. Another
direction in which the vertical integration in Russian agriculture
57
is evolving is the organization of cooperatives, whereby old
processing firms are linking up with local agricultural producers.
An important impetus for such a trend is the promotion of
vertical integration in the food sector by state food policy.
Vertical integration has been supported so as to favor an
efficient food market, although little attention has been paid to
the fact that more vertical integration results in fewer market
transactions for intermediate goods. State food policy must
therefore be refocused from the effort to facilitate consolidation
in the food market toward strengthening the legal system and
developing market infrastructure in order to render the forward
and spot markets in the food sector less risky. This may also
lead to more viable spot markets. A system must be in place
whereby resources can find their most economic use.
Increased vertical integration will likely lead to thinner markets
for intermediate goods. Thus, market failure may be the result
of increased vertical integration, since there are fewer
institutional mechanisms for enforcing contracts. This
conclusion merits additional investigation, perhaps through a
series of experiments which incorporate vertical integration as
an alternative to participation in the market.
This study has focused primarily on a particular transaction
cost, that is, the enforcement cost which arises after a
transaction. This cost is especially relevant in transition
economies, where the institutions may not be in place to
enforce contracts among agents in the market. The empirical
applications of transaction cost economics are limited in
number because transaction costs, by their nature, are difficult
to measure (Hobbs, 1997). We believe the experimental
economics approach employed in this study can be useful in
providing empirical content to the theoretical developments in
transaction cost economics. Moreover, laboratory techniques
are valuable in studying markets in transition economies, where
data are scarce or do not exist.
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APPENDIX A. Calculation of the Variance of Profit in the
Linked Market with Possible Contract Failure
σ2(Π) = var{pf⋅Σεi - ps⋅Σεi +vqf - v⋅Σεi +vqs} =
= var{(pf - ps)⋅Σεi +v(qf+qs) - v⋅Σεi}
We consider this variance as a variance of the sum of two
random variables. The first is Σεi times (pf+ps) plus v times
(qf+qs), and the second is a product of the two random
variables Σεi and v times (-1). Then,
σ2(Π) = var{(pf-ps)⋅Σεi + v(qf+qs)} + var{v⋅Σεi} -
- 2⋅cov{(pf - ps)⋅Σεi + v(qf+qs); v⋅Σεi}
Let us consider each of the additives separately.
var{(pf - ps)⋅Σεi + v(qf+qs)} = (pf-ps)2⋅qf⋅(ρ-ρ2) + (qf+qs)2⋅σ2(v)
var{v⋅Σεi} = [E(v)]2⋅σ2(Σεi) + [E(Σεi)]2⋅σ2(v) + σ2(v)⋅σ2(Σεi) =
= 0 + qf2(1-ρ)2⋅σ2(v) + qf(ρ-ρ2)⋅σ2(v) =
= qf2(1-ρ)2⋅σ2(v) + qf(ρ−ρ2)⋅σ2(v)
cov{(pf-ps)⋅Σεi+v(qf+qs); v⋅Σεi} =
= (pf-ps)⋅cov{Σεi; v⋅Σεi}+ (qf+qs)⋅cov{v; v⋅Σεi}
Consider the two covariances:
cov{Σεi; v⋅Σεi} = E[(Σεi)⋅(v⋅Σεi)] - E(Σεi)⋅E(v⋅Σεi) =
= E[(Σεi)2]⋅E(v) - [E(Σεi)]2⋅E(v) =0
cov{v; v⋅Σεi} = E[(v)⋅(v⋅Σεi)] - E(v)⋅E(v⋅Σεi) = E[(v)2]⋅E(Σεi) - 0 =
= {[E(v)]2+σ2(v)}⋅E(Σεi) = {0+σ2(v)}⋅qf(1-ρ) = σ2(v)⋅qf(1-ρ)
Thus,
cov{(pf - ps)⋅Σεi + v(qf+qs); v⋅Σεi} = 0 + (qf+qs)⋅σ2(v)⋅qf(1-ρ) =
(qf+qs)⋅σ2(v)⋅qf(1-ρ)
Then,
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σ2(Π) = (pf-ps)2⋅qf⋅(ρ-ρ2) + (qf+qs)2⋅σ2(v) + qf2(1-ρ)2⋅σ2(v) +
+ qf (ρ-ρ2)⋅σ2(v) - 2(qf+qs)⋅σ2(v)⋅qf(1-ρ) =
= qf(ρ−ρ2)⋅[(pf-ps)2+σ2(v)] + σ2(v)⋅[(qf+qs)2+qf2(1-ρ)2 -
- 2(qf+qs)⋅qf(1-ρ)] =
= qf(ρ−ρ2)⋅[(pf-ps)2 +σ2(v)]+
+ σ2(v)⋅[qf2+2qfqs+qs2 + qf(1-ρ)⋅(qf(1-ρ) - 2qf-2qs)] =
= qf(ρ−ρ2)⋅[(pf-ps)2+σ2(v)] +
+ σ2(v)⋅[qf2+2qfqs+qs2 +(qf-ρqf)⋅(qf(-1-ρ) -2qs)] =
= qf(ρ−ρ2)⋅[(pf-ps)2+σ2(v)] +
+ σ2(v)⋅[qf2+2qfqs+qs2 - (qf-ρqf)⋅(qf+ρqf+2qs)] =
= qf(ρ-ρ2)⋅[(pf-ps)2+σ2(v)] +
+ σ2(v)⋅[qf2+2qfqs+qs2-qf2-ρqf2-2qfqs+ρqf2+ρ2qf2+2ρqfqs] =
= qf(ρ−ρ2)⋅[(pf-ps)2+σ2(v)] + σ2(v)⋅[qs2 + ρ2qf2+2ρqfqs] =
= qf(ρ−ρ2)⋅[(pf-ps)2+σ2(v)] + σ2(v)⋅(qs+ρqf)2
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APPENDIX B. Numerical Examples
1. Linked Forward/Spot Market
To understand the way in which risk aversion can influence
equilibrium prices and quantities in the forward and spot linked
markets, we need to develop a model for a buyer in the linked
market. Consider a buyer who has an option to buy a good in
the forward or spot markets. Let qf and qs be the quantities of
units bought in the forward and spot markets, respectively, and
qf+qs = q. Also, let pf and ps be the forward and spot prices,
respectively. In our experiment a buyer does not face any price
risk in the spot market (at least no extra risk relative to that in
the forward market).
Then, buyer profit is Π = W(q) - pf×qf - ps×qs
First order conditions require:
d
dq
CE
f
Π
= Wf′(qf) - pf = 0          
d
dq
CE
s
Π
= Ws′(qs) - ps = 0
Now, we have two first order conditions for a seller and two for
a buyer. We can solve the four equations to find the four
variables (qf, qs, pf, and ps). To carry out the calculations we
must determine C′f(qf) and C′s(qs) and also W′f(qf) and W′s(qs).
Consider the total cost and redemption value in each of the
markets, taking into account the fact that the forward auction is
run first.
Cf(qf)=25qf+5qf2 ⇒ C′f(qf)=25+10qf
Cs(qs)=[25(qf+qs)+5(qf+qs)2]-[ 25qf+5qf2] ⇒ C′s(qs)=25+10(qf+qs)
Wf(qf)=135qf-5qf2 ⇒ W′f(qf)=135-10qf
Ws(qs)=[135(qf+qs)-5(qf+qs)2]-[135qf-5qf2] ⇒ W′s(qs)=135-10(qf+qs)
Solving the four first order conditions for any value of λ and
σ2(v) yields the following results: qf = 5,5 (5-6 units); pf = 80;
qs = 0; and ps = 0 (more precisely, ps = 80, but this does not
make sense because, according to the calculations, there
should be no spot trades). Thus, when there is a linked
forward/spot market, all trades are made in the linked forward
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market; the price level in the linked forward market is the same
as in the forward only market. Risk aversion does not influence
these results.
2. Linked Forward/Spot Market with Contract Failure
Consider a buyer who has an option to buy a good in the
forward or spot markets in a situation in which each forward
contract can fail separately with some known probability (ρ).
Again, let qf and qs be the quantities of units bought in the
forward and spot markets, respectively, and qf+qs = q. Also, let
pf and ps be the forward and spot prices, respectively. Let
ε = Σεi , i = 1,...,qf, be a binomially distributed random variable
with the probability of success at (1-ρ). Then, γ = Σ(1−ει) is a
random variable which equals the number of failures.
As in the experiment, let each unit bought be associated with a
distinct redemption value for a buyer wi. Then, wi is a marginal
redemption value, and summing wi through i = 1,...,q we get
the total redemption value function: Σwi = W(q), i = 1,...,q.
Again, in our experiment a buyer does not face any price risk in
the spot market (at least no more so than in the forward
market). Then, the risky profit for the buyer is:
Π = 
1
qf
∑ (wi⋅εi)-pf⋅
1
qf
∑ εi+
1
qf
∑ [wi⋅(1-εi)] +
qf
qf qs
+
+
∑
1
wi -ps⋅
1
qf
∑ (1-εi) - ps⋅qs =
= 
1
qf qs+
∑ wi -pf⋅
1
qf
∑ εi -ps⋅(qf-
1
qf
∑ εi) -ps⋅qs =
= W(qf+qs) - pf⋅
1
qf
∑ εi - ps⋅(qf-
1
qf
∑ εi+qs)
E(Π) = W(q) - pfqf(1-ρ) - ps(qfρ+qs)
σP2 = (pf-ps)2qf(ρ−ρ2)
ΠCE = W(q) - pfqf(1-ρ) - ps(qfρ+qs) - 
λ
2
⋅(pf-ps)2qf(ρ−ρ2)
d
dq
CE
f
Π
= W′f(qf) - pf(1-ρ) - psρ - λ
2
⋅(pf-ps)2(ρ−ρ2)
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d
dq
CE
s
Π
= W′s(qs) - ps
To make the calculations we must select an appropriate value
of λ (the absolute risk aversion coefficient) and σ2(v) (the spot
price variance). There is little consistency in the literature (for
example, Raskin and Cochran, 1986) on the appropriate
coefficients of absolute risk aversion or on the classifications of
specific coefficient values. The lower bounds in strongly risk-
averse preferences range from 0.000042 to 6.0. However, to
present an illustrative numerical example, we will use λ = 0.01.
For the numerical examples we use the actual values of σ2(v)
from the experiments. The spot price variance calculated using
the spot prices from the last three periods of each replication
of the LCF(5) market is 3.2, and the spot price variance for the
LCF(50) market was 7.5. We also use expressions for C′f(qf)
and C′s(qs) and also W′f(qf) and W′s(qs), as in the previous
example.
The models predict the following results for the 5% and 50%
levels of the probability of contract failure:
ρ = 0.05       σ2(v) = 3.2 ρ = 0.5        σ2(v) = 7.5
Risk
aversion
coefficient
Equilibrium
quantity
Equilibrium
price
Equilibrium
quantity
Equilibrium
price
λbuyer λseller qforward qspot pforward pspot qforward qspot pforward pspot
0 0 5-6
(5.50)
0 80.00 80.00 5-6
(5.50)
0 80.00 80.00
0.0
1
0 5-6
(5.49)
0
(0.001)
80.00 80.00 5-6
(5.5)
0 80.00 80.00
0 0.01 6-7
(6.75)
0
(-1.25)
66.80 79.96 5-6
(5.49)
0 80.10 80.10
0.0
1
0.01 6
(6.12)
0
(-0.62)
77.37 80.00 5-6
(5.4)
0-1
(0.1)
80.01 80.10
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The numerical results suggest that, when the probability of a
forward contract failure is small (5%), risk aversion forces the
agents to transact more in the forward linked market, and the
forward price is going down and is below the spot price. (Note
that, even though there is no spot production, there still could
be spot trades involving retraded units which failed in the
forward market. Thus, there could be a spot price.)
A tenfold increase in the probability of a forward contract failure
(50%) reduces forward trades, but only by a very small amount,
and allows for some spot production.] Risk aversion forces both
the forward and the spot prices up relative to the case of a 5%
probability of a forward contract failure, though the spot price is
still higher than the forward price.
3. Linked Forward/Spot Market with Transaction Cost
As in previous examples, to understand the way in which
possible transaction costs and risk aversion can influence
equilibrium prices and quantities in the forward and spot linked
markets, we need to develop a model for a buyer in a linked
market with a possible transaction cost. Consider a buyer who
can transact in the forward or spot market, while there is a
possible additional transaction cost for a trade in the forward
linked market.
Again, let qf and qs be the quantities of units produced to be
traded in the forward and spot markets, respectively, and qf+qs
= q. Also, let pf and ps be the forward and spot prices,
respectively. As in the previous example, a buyer does not face
any price risk in the spot market (at least no more than is
present in the forward market).
Let ε = Σεi , i = 1,...,qf, be a binomially distributed random
variable with a probability of success (that is, εi = 1) ρ. Here,
success in Bernoulli’s exercise causes failure for a trade (the
buyer has to incur an additional cost of transacting, t).
The risky profit is Π = W(q) - pf⋅qf - ps⋅qs - t⋅ε
The expected profit and the variance of the profit are:
E(Π) = W(q) - pf⋅qf - ps⋅qs - t⋅ρ⋅qf σ2(Π) = t2⋅qf⋅(ρ−ρ2)
The certainty equivalent of the profit expression is
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ΠCE = W(q) - pf⋅qf - ps⋅qs - t⋅ρ⋅qf - 
λ
2
⋅t2⋅qf⋅(ρ−ρ2)
First order conditions require:
d
dq
CE
f
Π
= Wf′(qf) - pf - t⋅ρ - λ
2
⋅t2⋅(ρ−r2) = 0
d
dq
CE
s
Π
= Ws′(qs) - ps = 0
Again, for the numerical examples we use the actual values of
σ2(v) from the experiments. The spot price variance calculated
using spot prices from the last three periods of each replication
of the LTC(50;10) market was 15.0. We also use expressions
for C′f(qf) and C′s(qs) and also W′f(qf) and W′s(qs) as in previous
examples.
The models predict the following results for a 50% probability of
an additional transaction cost of 10 tokens for a forward trade:
Risk aversion
coefficient
Equilibrium quantity Equilibrium price
λbuyer λseller qforward qspot pforward pspot
0 0 5 (5.00) 0-1 (0.5) 80.00 80.00
0.01 0 4-5 (4.99) 0-1 (0.51) 79.90 80.00
0 0.01 4-5 (4.99) 0-1 (0.51) 80.03 80.04
0.01 0.01 4-5 (4.99) 0-1 (0.51) 80.00 80.05
0.10 0.10 4-5 (4.88) 0-1 (0.58) 80.05 80.40
0.50 0.50 4-5 (4.38) 0-1 (0.81) 80.05 83.10
The numerical results suggest that, when there is a 50%
probability of an additional transaction cost of 10 tokens for a
forward trade for both sellers and buyers, subjects still prefer to
transact most units in the forward market. Risk aversion forces
the quantity traded forward to go down, the quantity traded
spot to go up, and the prices in both the forward and the spot
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linked markets to be higher, with the spot price higher than the
forward price.
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APPENDIX C. Examples of Participant Instructions
Choice Experiment
For each of the following 19 choices, put an X in the column
following either Option A, or B. One of the choices will be
selected at random, and the lottery to determine your payment
will be conducted at the end of the experiment. At the end of
the experiment the 19 balls numbered 1 through 19 will be
placed in the lottery game. The first ball selected by the
machine will identify the option which will determine your
payoff. Then 20 balls numbered 1 through 20 will be placed in
the machine, and another ball will be selected to determine the
outcome of the lottery in Option B.
Choice Option A Option B
1 2 3 4 5
1 $2.50 for
sure
$5 if the number is greater than 1 (95% chance)
versus $0 if the number is 1 (5% chance)
2 $2.50 for
sure
$5 if the number is greater than 2 (90% chance)
versus $0 if the number is 2 or less (10%
chance)
3 $2.50 for
sure
$5 if the number is greater than 3 (85% chance)
versus $0 if the number is 3 or less (15%
chance)
4 $2.50 for
sure
$5 if the number is greater than 4 (80% chance)
versus $0 if the number is 4 or less (20%
chance)
5 $2.50 for
sure
$5 if the number is greater than 5 (75% chance)
versus $0 if the number is 5 or less (25%
chance)
6 $2.50 for
sure
$5 if the number is greater than 6 (70% chance)
versus $0 if the number is 6 or less (30%
chance)
7 $2.50 for
sure
$5 if the number is greater than 7 (65% chance)
versus $0 if the number is 7 or less (35%
chance)
8 $2.50 for
sure
$5 if the number is greater than 8 (60% chance)
versus $0 if the number is 8 or less (40%
chance)
9 $2.50 for
sure
$5 if the number is greater than 9 (55% chance)
versus $0 if the number is 9 or less (45%
chance)
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1 2 3 4 5
10 $2.50 for
sure
$5 if the number is greater than 10 (50%
chance) versus $0 if the number is 10 or less
(50% chance)
11 $2.50 for
sure
$5 if the number is greater than 11 (45%
chance) versus $0 if the number is 11 or less
(55% chance)
12 $2.50 for
sure
$5 if the number is greater than 12 (40%
chance) versus $0 if the number is 12 or less
(60% chance)
13 $2.50 for
sure
$5 if the number is greater than 13 (35%
chance) versus $0 if the number is 13 or less
(65% chance)
14 $2.50 for
sure
$5 if the number is greater than 14 (30%
chance) versus $0 if the number is 14 or less
(70% chance)
15 $2.50 for
sure
$5 if the number is greater than 15 (25%
chance) versus $0 if the number is 15 or less
(75% chance)
16 $2.50 for
sure
$5 if the number is greater than 16 (20%
chance) versus $0 if the number is 16 or less
(80% chance)
17 $2.50 for
sure
$5 if the number is greater than 17 (15%
chance) versus $0 if the number is 17 or less
(85% chance)
18 $2.50 for
sure
$5 if the number is greater than 18 (10%
chance) versus $0 if the number is 18 or less
(90% chance)
19 $2.50 for
sure
$5 if the number is greater than 19 (5% chance)
versus $0 if the number is 19 or less (95%
chance)
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Linked Forward / Spot Market with Possible Contract
Failure (LCF)
Introduction
This is an experiment in the economics of market
decisionmaking. In this experiment, some of you will be
BUYERS, and some of you will be SELLERS. You have been
provided with forms which are labeled either BUYER RECORD
SHEET, or SELLER RECORD SHEET. The sheet you have
received reveals whether you are a buyer or a seller in this
experiment and also gives you an ID number. These record
sheets will be used for the purpose of illustration only. You will
receive actual record sheets just prior to the beginning of the
experiment.
The commodity you are trading is referred to as a "unit".
Sellers make earnings by producing units at a cost and selling
these units to buyers. Buyers make earnings by purchasing
units from sellers and then redeeming (or reselling) these units
to the experimenter. Earnings are recorded in a fictitious
currency called tokens. Tokens are exchanged for cash at the
rate of _________. Your earnings will be paid to you in CASH at
the end of the experiment. To begin, every seller and buyer will
be given an initial beginning balance of _________. You may
keep this money, PLUS any you earn. Your goal is to maximize
your earnings by selling or buying units. You can add to the
initial balances only by buying or selling units during the
experiment.
Buyers and sellers will exchange units for tokens over a
sequence of trading cycles. The organization of a trading cycle
is depicted below in Figure 1.
Each trading cycle consists of a forward market, an assessment
of the success or failure of selected trades in the forward
market, a production period, and a spot market. The forward
market occurs before sellers have produced any units. In this
experiment, trades in the forward market may fail. An equal
and known probability of failure will be assigned to each
trade. In this session, the probability that each trade will fail will
be _____. All of this occurs before the unit has actually been
produced. The spot market occurs after sellers have produced
units. In the spot market sellers therefore have units ready (or
"in stock") to be sold.
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The forward and spot markets are therefore separated by a
production period. During the production period, sellers decide
on the total number of units they will produce for the cycle.
They must produce at least as many units as they have
already sold in the forward market, including those which
have failed. Any units produced which have not already been
sold in the forward market are then available to sell in the spot
market, along with units which may have failed in the forward
market.
All trading in the forward and spot markets is conducted via an
oral double auction. During every trading cycle, you account for
the sales or purchases which you have made and adjust your
token (ending) balance accordingly on the record sheet. This
ending balance becomes the beginning balance in the next
cycle. After you have properly recorded and totaled this
information, a new trading cycle will begin. This experiment will
consist of approximately seven or eight trading cycles. We will
conduct practice cycles to familiarize you with the mechanics of
the auction and the recordkeeping before the actual
experiment begins.
Specific Instructions to Buyers
If you have been designated as a buyer, please refer to your
BUYER RECORD SHEET for practice cycle 1. Remember, the
values on this sheet are hypothetical. You will receive actual
Figure 1. Organization of Trading Cycle
SELLERS:
PRODUCTION PERIOD
PRODUCE
UNITS
SPOT
MARKET
CONTRACT
FAILURE
WAITBUYERS:
FORWARD
MARKET
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record sheets (with values for the experiment) after the practice
cycle.
During each trading cycle you are free to purchase up to eight
units. You may purchase units in the forward market or in the
spot market or both. For the first unit that you buy during a
trading cycle, you will receive the amount listed under UNIT
VALUE for Unit 1. In this example, this amount is 529 tokens.
The redemption value of Unit 1 is 529 tokens. For the second
unit that you buy you will receive the amount listed under UNIT
VALUE for Unit 2, which is 483 tokens. The redemption values
for subsequent units are found in the same way.
The earnings for each unit that you purchase (which are yours
to keep) are computed by taking the difference between the
redemption value and the purchase price of the unit bought.
That is,
Your Earnings = Redemption Value – Purchase Price
Suppose, for example, that you buy two units in the forward
market. One of these, say the purchase of Unit 2 in the forward
market, is randomly chosen to fail. You must then renegotiate a
purchase price for this unit in the spot market using the UNIT
VALUE for that unit, along with any other units you wish to
purchase in the spot market. If you pay 400 tokens for the first
unit and initially agreed to pay 410 tokens for the second unit in
the forward market, but renegotiated Unit 2 for 420 tokens in
the spot market, your earnings are:
earnings for Unit 1 = 529 - 400 = 129
earnings for Unit 2 = 483 - 420 = 63
total earnings = 129 + 63 = 192 tokens
On the other hand, if you fail to buy Unit 2 in the spot market,
the earnings would be zero for that unit, and the total earnings
would be 129 tokens instead of 192.
There are blanks on the record sheet for the recording of the
purchase price and the earnings of each unit that you may
purchase. Note that there is also a column which you may use
to identify the trades, if any, that failed in the forward market.
Again, in the spot market you may purchase units which failed
in the forward market using the UNIT VALUE for the failed unit.
If you do not renegotiate the purchase of a failed unit, you get
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zero earnings for that unit. Also, note that the unit earnings
must be revised using the New Purchase Price for failed units.
During the experiment you will record information as you
purchase units. Buyers should also be aware that, to buy units,
they cannot spend more than the number of tokens that they
have in their beginning balances in any one cycle. Finally,
buyers need not and should not trade a unit unless they can
realize positive earnings for that unit. Thus, you need not
purchase all eight units.
Specific Instructions to Sellers
If you have been designated as a seller, please refer to your
SELLER RECORD SHEET for practice cycle 1. Remember, the
costs on this sheet are hypothetical. You will receive actual
record sheets (with costs for the experiment) after the practice
cycle.
During each trading cycle you are free to produce and sell up
to eight units. The first unit that you produce during a trading
cycle will cost you the amount listed under UNIT COST for Unit
1. In this example, this cost is 71 tokens. The unit cost of Unit 1
is 71 tokens. The second unit that you produce will cost you the
amount listed under UNIT COST for Unit 2, which is 117 tokens.
The unit costs for subsequent units are found in the same way.
The earnings from each unit that you produce and sell (the
earnings are yours to keep) are computed by taking the
difference between the sale price and the unit cost of the unit
sold, that is,
Your Earnings = Sale Price – Unit Cost
You may sell units in the forward market or in the spot market
or both. Units sold in the forward market are sold BEFORE you
have produced them. You must produce any unit sold in the
forward market, including those which have failed. (The
monitor will remind sellers of this responsibility during the
experiment.) Suppose, for example, that you sell two units in
the forward market. Once trading in the forward market has
finished, you must produce at least Unit 1 and Unit 2. If you
have decided to produce a total of three units, you would then
have Unit 3 to sell in the spot market, assuming neither Unit 1,
nor Unit 2 fails. (Note that there is a blank on the record sheet
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for the recording of “Units Produced”.) Be aware that if you fail
to sell Unit 3 in the spot market, you will still incur the cost of
producing Unit 3. If this occurs, your unit earnings for Unit 3
would be -169 tokens (that is, your unit earnings for Unit 3
would be negative). In other words, you will not be permitted to
carry over units to the next trading cycle.
Let's suppose that in the forward market you initially sell Unit 1
for 210 tokens and Unit 2 for 230 tokens. The sale of Unit 1 in
the forward market is randomly chosen to fail. You must then
renegotiate a sale price for this unit in the spot market using
the UNIT COST for that unit, along with any other units you wish
to sell in the spot market. Say you sell Unit 1 for 200 tokens
and also sell Unit 3 in the spot market for 220 tokens. Your
earnings would then be:
earnings for Unit 1 = 200 - 71 = 129
earnings for Unit 2 = 230 - 117 = 113
earnings for Unit 3 = 220 - 169 = 51
total earnings = 129 + 113 + 51 = 293 tokens
If you failed to sell Unit 1 in the spot market, you would lose the
UNIT COST; the earnings for that unit would be – 71, and the
total earnings would be 93 tokens, instead of 293.
There are blanks on the record sheet for recording the
productive decision, the sale price, and the unit earnings of
each unit that you may produce and sell. Note that there also is
a column which you may use to identify the trades, if any, that
failed in the forward market. Again, using the UNIT COST for
each failed unit, you may sell in the spot market the units which
failed in the forward market. If you fail to renegotiate the
sale of a failed unit, you lose the unit cost for that unit.
Also, note that earnings must be revised using the New Sale
price for failed units. During the experiment you will record
information as you sell units. Sellers should also be aware that
they cannot incur a production cost greater than the amount in
their beginning token balance in any one cycle.
Finally, in the forward market, sellers need not and should not
trade a unit unless they can realize positive earnings on that
unit. They may, however, wish to trade at a loss in the spot
market, so as not to lose the entire cost of a unit which has
77
been produced for sale. Thus, you need not produce and sell
all eight units.
Trading Rules for Both the Forward and the Spot Markets
Only one unit may be bought and sold at a time. Buyers
compete with other buyers to purchase units by making "bids".
A "bid" is the proposed price at which a buyer is willing to
purchase a unit; obviously, it should be below the redemption
or resale value for the particular unit being purchased. Bids
must become progressively higher. In other words, if the first
bid for a unit is 100 tokens, then the second bid must be higher
than 100 tokens. Suppose the second bid is 120 tokens, then
the third bid must be higher than 120, and so on. Bids will be
recorded on the chalkboard as they occur.
Sellers compete with other sellers to sell units by making
"offers". An "offer" is the proposed price at which a seller is
willing to sell a unit; obviously, it should be higher than the cost
for the particular unit being sold. Offers must become
progressively lower. In other words, if the first offer to sell a unit
is for 200 tokens, then the second offer must be lower than 200
tokens. Suppose the second offer is 180 tokens, then the third
offer must be less than 180, and so on. Offers will be recorded
on the chalkboard as they occur.
There is one further set of restrictions on bids and offers. These
are common sense restrictions. A buyer's bid cannot be higher
than the best or lowest offer displayed on the chalkboard. In
other words, a buyer cannot attempt to pay a price which is
higher than that at which some seller is willing to sell. Similarly,
a seller's offer cannot be lower than the best or highest bid
displayed on the chalkboard. In other words, a seller cannot
attempt to sell at a price below that which some buyer is willing
to pay.
A bid is made by simply calling out a price in tokens, for
instance: "bid x tokens". Similarly, an offer is made by calling
out a price in tokens, for example: "offer x tokens". During a
market, buyers will be making bids at the same time that sellers
are making offers.
It should be apparent that the difference between the BEST BID
and the BEST OFFER gradually decreases. A trade is made
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when the BEST BID equals the BEST OFFER. Suppose the
BEST BID is 150 tokens and the BEST OFFER is 160 tokens. If
a buyer decides that he or she is willing to purchase the unit for
160 tokens, he or she calls out "bid 160 tokens" or "accept".
Likewise, suppose the BEST BID is 150 and the BEST OFFER is
160. If a seller decides that he or she is willing to sell the unit
for 150 tokens, he or she calls out "offer 150 tokens" or
"accept".
After a seller and buyer have made a trade, the monitor records
the respective ID numbers of the buyer and seller making the
transaction. The buyer and the seller then record the trade
price in the appropriate place on their respective record sheets.
The buyer and seller who have made a transaction then move
on to the next unit on their record sheet. Each buyer and
seller must move to the next unit in the record sheet only
after having bought/sold the previous unit. Buyers and
sellers may then resume making bids and offers for additional
units.
Trades may occur until such time as bids and offers cease or
the monitor stops trading. Again, after trading ceases in the
forward market, there is an assessment of whether or not each
trade in the forward market failed. This is followed by a
production period, which in turn is followed by a spot market.
Each trade will have an equal chance of failing, with a
probability of _______. After trading ceases in the spot market
and all participants have completed their record sheets,
another trading cycle begins.
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NOTES
                                                          
1 G could be interpreted as the difference between the quantity produced
times a transfer price within the integrated firm, minus production cost.
2 We will ignore for convenience the problem of the extreme negative values
of v that would generate a negative spot price. Robison and Barry (1987, p.
91) have formulated an uncertain price in a market with advance production in
the same way.
3 In fact, we ran 19 sessions, but we had to reject the results of the first
replication of the linked market (session L1) because the experiment had to be
stopped after period 6, one participant having become ill.
4 Several students from other universities and several students in the second
course year of SPSUEF also participated.
5 Since the risk attitude scores of buyers in the FCF(5) market were not
significantly different from those of sellers and since the scores of the buyers
and the sellers were not significantly different from risk neutral, theory predicts
that the agents will merely maximize their expected profit. If we solve the
economic models using the equations from the experiment and = 0,
we get the price in the FCF(5) market equal to 82.05 tokens, which is very
close to the experiment results (Table 3).
6 In this case an aggressive seller is a seller making lower than expected asks
(or accepting lower than expected bids).
7 This cost involves retrading the effort cost and the risk cost of the uncertain
spot price which results from the failed units.
8 This result is in contrast to the findings of Krogmeier et al. (1996), where the
spot market and the forward market are separate treatments, with no
exogenous shock, and Phillips, Menkhaus and Krogmeier (1997), where there
is endogenous choice among the market institutions, with no exogenous
shock. In the first paper the authors find the spot prices significantly (about
seven tokens) higher than the forward prices, while in the second paper the
spot prices are about three tokens lower than the forward prices. (Note that in
both these cases the experiments used the same supply-demand schedule
employed in this study, though they were computerized.)
9 In the early periods, when the equilibrium price was not certain, some sellers
produced a little more for the spot market than they could sell for a profit. In
an attempt to minimize losses, a seller may sell a unit even if the cost is not
covered entirely. As the sellers learn the supply-demand situation in the spot
market, they produce only those units for which the cost is covered by the
prevailing price.
10 Some sellers, for example, may want to risk an uncertain spot price for the
sake of benefiting if the spot price is higher than the forward price.
11 In periods 6 through 8 in sessions FCF1 and FCF3, no more than one seller
of the four in each session sold unit number 6 (with a cost of 80 tokens). In
session FCF2 the marginal unit was sold more often even at the end of the
session. At the same time seller 6 in that session was selling only two or three
units even during the last periods. This must have caused the higher price we
observed in that session and made the sale of marginal units more attractive
for the other sellers. The behavior of seller 6 (FCF2) is difficult to explain: she
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was not extremely risk averse according to her risk attitude score (8).
12 The main results of our oral version of the LCF(50) market experiment are
consistent with the results of the computer version which has recently been
conducted by Menkhaus and his colleagues at the University of Wyoming,
U.S.A. The latter results suggest that in this market the total quantity and the
quantity traded forward decrease as compared to the situation in the L market
(computer version), but the forward market still dominates. In the computer
version of LCF(50), market forward prices are also higher than are the spot
prices.
13 This may be partly explained by the fact that both buyers and sellers have
risk attitude scores in the LTC(50;10) treatment that are significantly lower
than the risk neutral score.
14 These results for the L market are consistent with previous research.
Phillips, Menkhaus and Krogmeier (1997) observe that about 10% to 15% of
the total transactions occur in the spot market in a linked setting.
15 In our LCF(5) experiments, however, in period 6 (because of the LCF(5)1
session) the average spot trades accounted for 27% of the total quantity
produced in the LCF(5) market, and the average spot production was 22%. At
the same time, in four of the eight periods of session LCF(5)3 no units were
produced to be traded spot. (Interestingly, in this replication the sellers were
significantly more risk averse than were the buyers. A higher level of risk
aversion leads sellers to trade more quantity forward, and this is consistent
with the theoretical model.) In session LCF(5)2, from one to three units were
produced for the spot market. Even at the peak of spot production in period 6
of the LCF(5) market, it is obvious that forward trading dominated.
16 This opportunity is the same for all treatments, except FCF(5), where 5% of
the trades fail without a possibility of being retraded. In the LTC(50;10)
treatment, with a possible additional transaction cost in the forward market,
subjects can transact in the spot market.
